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system should address unjustified pay disparities between men and
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Wal-Mart exemplifies how litigation remedies tend to be ineffective for pay
discrimination because of the intent requirement of Title VII, the prima
facie standard of substantial equality under the Equal Pay Act, the broad
‚factor-other-than-sex‛ defense, and the procedural difficulties for group
actions.
This Article proposes a blueprint for a more effective remedy for pay
discrimination that would (1) provide incentives for self-regulation by
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necessity; (3) incorporate a pragmatic interpretation of equal work; and (4)
facilitate group actions for systemic pay discrimination.
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INTRODUCTION

I

n Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,1 the U.S. Supreme Court held that an
estimated 1.5 million current and former female Wal-Mart employees
could not challenge discriminatory pay and promotions as a national
class action. The Court unanimously held that individualized monetary
claims, such as the employees’ backpay claims, may not be certified as a
class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2).2 Although four
justices would have remanded the case for a determination of whether
Plaintiffs could instead proceed as a class under Rule 23(b)(3),3 a fivejustice majority cut off that possibility ‚at the starting gate,‛4 holding that
the employees had failed to prove sufficient ‚commonality‛ among their
claims—one of the threshold requirements for any type of class action. 5
Wal-Mart has been criticized and praised as representing many
different things: the demise of class actions in employment discrimination
cases;6 a blow to women’s equality;7 a sensible, unsurprising result given
the size of the proposed class;8 an example of the Court’s whittling away of
civil rights by heightening procedural standards;9 an example of the pro-

1

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes (Wal-Mart III), 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
Id. at 2557-61.
3 Id. at 2561-62 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice Ginsburg was
joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan.
4 Id. at 2562.
5 Id. at 2556-57 (majority opinion). Justice Scalia wrote for the majority, which included
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Thomas, and Kennedy.
2

6 See Suzette Malveaux, Money Matters, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com
/roomfordebate/2011/06/20/a-death-blow-to-class-action/money-matters (concluding that the
Court’s decision ‚effectively reverses close to 50 years of Title VII jurisprudence and makes it
harder for employees to collectively fight systemic discrimination and to be compensated for
corporate misconduct‛).
7 See Tanya Hernandez, Far From Random Bias, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2011, http://
www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/06/20/a-death-blow-to-class-action/wal-mart-farfrom-random-bias (‚Given Wal-Mart’s size in the labor market, this court decision not only
disserves the plaintiffs’ search for justice, it also disserves all women’s search for gender
equality.‛).
8 See John Elwood, Too Many Claims, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com
/roomfordebate/2011/06/20/a-death-blow-to-class-action/too-many-claims-in-the-wal-mart-vdukes-case (‚I expected the court to reject the class claims; the sheer number of putative classmembers (1.5 million), and the nationwide breadth of the company, would have made it very
difficult to prove that common acts of discrimination required classwide resolution.‛); Walter
Olson, Wal-Mart v. Dukes: The Court Gets One Right, CATO@LIBERTY (June 20, 2011, 12:57 PM),
http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/wal-mart-v-dukes-the-court-gets-one-right/ (‚*T+he majority’s
opinion today is to be preferred as a matter of policy, fairness, and liberty.‛).
9

See Melissa Hart, Hostility Toward Working Women, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2011, http://www
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business bias of the Roberts Court;10 and a justified victory for corporate
America.11 Missing from this commentary is one of the key lessons from
this case: the failure of federal law to provide an effective litigation remedy
for systemic pay discrimination.
Wal-Mart provides a unique opportunity to reflect on whether and how
the legal system should address unjustified pay disparities between men
and women.12 Although the Court decided a procedural issue concerning
class certification, its ruling was based largely on the underlying remedial
scheme of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,13 the statute under which
Plaintiffs sued. As reflected in the majority’s opinion, Title VII is a difficult
legal remedy for most pay discrimination in the modern workplace. Under
the disparate treatment theory of Title VII, the plaintiff must prove that the
employer harbored sex-based animus and intentionally paid her less because
of her sex. This approach conceptualizes pay discrimination as a civil-rights
violation in which the employer deliberately victimizes a woman with
lower pay. Indeed, references to Plaintiffs as ‚victims‛ of discrimination

.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/06/20/a-death-blow-to-class-action/failing-to-recognizediscrimination (‚This creation of heightened standards for class litigation mirrors the
heightened pleading standards that the same majority has created out of whole cloth in the
recent Iqbal v. Ashcroft and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly decisions.‛); see also Barriers to Justice
and Accountability: How the Supreme Court’s Recent Rulings Will Affect Corporate Behavior:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 5-6, 8 (2011) (prepared testimony of
Melissa Hart, Associate Professor, Univ. Colo. Sch. of Law) [hereinafter Hart Testimony],
available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/11-6-29%20Hart%20Testimony.pdf.
10 See ALLIANCE FOR JUST., THE CORPORATE COURT’S 2010-11 TERM:
PROTECTING
CORPORATE INTERESTS WHEN IT MATTERS MOST 3 (2011), available at http://www.afj.org/
connect-with-the-issues/the-corporate-court/the-corporate-court-2010-11-end-of-yearreport.pdf (‚This was another very good year for corporate interests at the U.S. Supreme
Court, and a very bad one for Americans seeking fairness and justice.‛); Adam Serwer, WalMart v. Dukes: The Difficulty of Proving the Old Boy Network Exists, AM. PROSPECT BLOG (June
20, 2011, 4:00 PM), http://prospect.org/article/wal-mart-v-dukes-difficulty-proving-old-boynetwork-exists (summarizing views that ‚the success of business interests in the Roberts
Court . . . reflects not just the attitudes of the conservative majority, but the relatively
conservative view of all the justices on the bench on the proper role of the courts‛).
11 See All Things Considered: Top Court Rules in Favor of Wal-Mart, National Public Radio
(June 20, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/06/20/137304956/top-court-rules-in-favor-of-walmart (‚This is an extremely important victory not just for Wal-Mart but for all companies who
do business in the United States.‛ (quoting Wal-Mart’s lawyer, Ted Boutrous)); Olson, supra
note 8 (stating that ‚*t+he majority’s opinion today is to be preferred as a matter of policy,
fairness, and liberty‛).
12

The plaintiffs in Wal-Mart also alleged discrimination in promotions, but this Article
focuses primarily on the compensation issues involved. See Wal-Mart III, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2548
(2011).
13

42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006).
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pervaded the briefs of the parties and the Court’s decision in Wal-Mart.14
Title VII’s requirement that plaintiffs prove intentional discrimination
or ‚victimization‛ ignores the complex, subtle realities of pay
discrimination. In the modern workplace, pay decisions are increasingly
established through more subjective systems, which vest supervisors with
significant discretion to vary pay rates for workers performing the same
job. Prior research has overwhelmingly shown that the more discretionary
the compensation system, the more likely it is that women will experience
a gender pay gap.15
Plaintiffs in Wal-Mart attempted to show that the company’s highly
discretionary system for pay and promotions created a pattern or practice
of discrimination against female employees in violation of Title VII in three
ways. First, Plaintiffs presented detailed statistical evidence about stark
pay disparities between men and women performing the same jobs
throughout Wal-Mart.16 Second, they offered expert social science
testimony to explain how Wal-Mart’s discretionary system of decision
making for pay and promotions, combined with a strong corporate culture
of sex stereotyping, provided a conduit for pay discrimination against
women.17 Third, Plaintiffs peppered the record with examples of gender
bias—more than one hundred anecdotes about supervisors who made
explicit sex-based comments or admitted paying women less because they
believed men deserved more money as ‚breadwinners‛ in their families.18
Even with all of this evidence, the majority held that there was not a
single common question presented by Plaintiffs sufficient to establish
commonality for class certification. Undergirding the majority’s opinion is
14

See, e.g., Wal-Mart III, 131 S. Ct. at 2548 (emphasis added) (‚*T+hereby making every
woman at the company the victim of one common discriminatory practice.‛); Brief for
Petitioner at 17, Wal-Mart III, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (No. 10-277), 2011 WL 201045 (emphasis added)
(‚Where the plaintiff proves that she is the victim of intentional discrimination . . . [she] has
made out a disparate-treatment claim . . . .‛); id. at 33 (emphasis added) (‚*S+uch proof would
not establish that any other woman in any other store was the victim of intentional
discrimination.‛); Brief for Respondents at 62, Wal-Mart III, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (No. 10-277), 2011
WL 686407 (emphasis added) (‚Where a group of victims challenge the same discriminatory
employment practice, Rule 23 provides an efficient and economical means of adjudicating
these claims.‛); id. at 63 (emphasis added) (‚It is inevitable that the class of victims affected by
an allegedly discriminatory workplace practice will include both current and former
employees.‛).
15 Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Money, Sex, and Sunshine: A Market-Based Approach to Pay
Discrimination, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 951, 971-82, 995 (2011) (discussing statistics and numerous
studies that show that the wage gap increases for women who have achieved the highest
levels of education and professional status and who work the greatest number of hours).
16
17
18

See discussion infra Part I.A and accompanying notes.
See infra Part I.A and accompanying notes.
See infra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
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the belief that most employers do not intend to pay women less—rather,
most pay disparities are the unintended consequence of otherwise sexneutral reasons. As Justice Scalia wrote: ‚[L]eft to their own devices most
managers in any corporation—and surely most managers in a corporation
that forbids sex discrimination—would select sex-neutral, performancebased criteria for hiring and promotion that produce no actionable
disparity at all.‛19
The problem is not Justice Scalia’s presumption that most managers
would choose not to discriminate. Although intentional pay discrimination
undoubtedly continues to exist, many scholars have likewise written that
most employers do not intend to pay women less because of their sex.20 The
issue is that Title VII puts the burden on the plaintiff to prove the
discriminatory reasons for the disparity, rather than putting the burden on
the employer to prove that pay disparities between employees performing
similar jobs are nondiscriminatory and justified.21 The Title VII standard
diverts attention away from the real problem: the pay disparity itself.
Pay disparities may be caused by a variety of factors that can be
discriminatory or non-discriminatory, intentional or unintentional, or
structural or individual. Title VII disparate-treatment theory only reaches
disparities that are both discriminatory and intentional. Title VII is less
effective at attacking pay disparities that may be unintentionally
discriminatory, such as those resulting from highly subjective, opaque, or
ambiguous compensation schemes. And yet, as existing scholarship
explains, most modern-day pay discrimination results from a variety of
complex social, cognitive, and situational factors that may not rise to the
level of discrimination under Title VII.22 Although Title VII disparateimpact theory permits plaintiffs to allege that an otherwise neutral

19

Wal-Mart III, 131 S. Ct. at 2554.
Eisenberg, supra note 15, at 986; see also Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our
Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47
STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1164 (1995) (applying social-cognition theory to explain how
discriminatory decisions result from sex stereotypes and unconscious bias); Nicole Buonocore
Porter & Jessica R. Vartanian, Debunking the Market Myth in Pay Discrimination Cases, 12 GEO. J.
GENDER & L. 159, 184 (2011) (explaining how gender schemas affect how employers value
women and how women value themselves).
20

21

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2006) (stating that in order to establish a ‚disparate impact‛ a
complaining party must show that an employer used an otherwise neutral employment policy
or practice that has an adverse impact on a protected group).
22 See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 15, 961, 966; Barbara J. Flagg, Fashioning a Title VII Remedy
for Transparently White Subjective Decisionmaking, 104 YALE L.J. 2009, 2010-14 (1995); Krieger,
supra note 20, at 1164-65; David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L.
REV. 899, 899-901 (1993); Porter & Vartanian, supra note 20, at 184-95; Amy L. Wax,
Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129, 1330-32 (1999).
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employment policy has discriminatory results,23 the Court’s holding in
Wal-Mart may eviscerate the viability of this theory for many women,
particularly national classes.
In the modern workplace, Title VII’s intentionality requirement is
anachronistic. A remedial framework akin to that of the Federal Equal Pay
Act (‚EPA‛)24 provides a more realistic approach for assessing pay
discrimination because intent is irrelevant under the EPA. 25 The EPA
focuses on the pay disparity itself, rather than the mindset of the employer.
If the plaintiff shows that she is paid less for equal work, 26 the burden of
proof shifts to the employer to prove that the pay disparity is justified by
specific, job-related criteria, such as merit or experience.27 EPA case law
rejects subjective decision making as a proper defense for unequal pay for
equal work.28
Yet, the plaintiffs in Wal-Mart did not allege violations of the EPA—a
strategic decision that is not unusual or surprising. Although the EPA

23 See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986-87, 991 (1988) (holding that
disparate-impact theory may be applied to a subjective or discretionary promotion system);
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430, 436 (1971) (holding that employer’s requirement
of high school education and passage of standardized general intelligence test had disparate
impact on black employees in violation of Title VII).
24

29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2006).
See Mickelson v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 460 F.3d 1304, 1310-11 (10th Cir. 2006) (explaining
that the EPA imposes ‚a form of strict liability on employers who pay males more than
females for performing the same work—in other words, the plaintiff . . . need not prove that
the employer acted with discriminatory intent‛).
25

26 A plaintiff establishes a prima facie case under the EPA by proving that she and a male
employee were paid differently for ‚equal work on jobs the performance of which requires
equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working
conditions . . . .‛ 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1).
27

Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 196-97 (1974) (explaining that employer
bears burden of proof on affirmative defenses). The EPA has four exceptions to the mandate
of equal pay for equal work. The employer may prove that the pay disparity was ‚made
pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings
by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than
sex . . . .‛ 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1).
28 See, e.g., EEOC v. White & Son Enters., 881 F.2d 1006, 1009-10 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding
that employer’s defense failed because the company had no written or objective system of
setting wages); Keziah v. W.M. Brown & Son, Inc., 888 F.2d 322, 326 (4th Cir. 1989) (‚One of
the things undermining the company’s defense is the pure subjectivity of the salary-setting
process.‛); Brennan v. Victoria Bank & Trust Co., 493 F.2d 896, 902 (5th Cir. 1974)
(‚*S+ubjective evaluations of the employer cannot stand alone as a basis for salary
discrimination based on sex.‛); Hodgson v. Brookhaven Gen. Hosp., 436 F.2d 719, 726 (5th Cir.
1970) (recognizing that permitting a defense to pay disparities based on assertions of ‚merit‛
and ‚performance,‛ ‚if not strictly construed against the employer, could easily ‘swallow the
rule’‛).
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provides a more realistic conceptual model for pay discrimination, the
statute imposes steep litigation hurdles on plaintiffs. First, the EPA has a
threshold prima-facie standard of substantial equality between compared
positions. Some courts have interpreted this standard so strictly as to
exclude most working women—especially those in higher-level jobs and
non-assembly line positions—from the Act’s coverage.29 Second, the EPA
includes a catch-all ‚factor-other-than-sex‛ affirmative defense, which
some courts have interpreted broadly to immunize employers from
liability.30 Finally, the EPA prohibits class actions and requires each
plaintiff to file an individual consent form with the court indicating her
desire to ‚opt in‛ to the collective action.31 This increases the administrative
and discovery costs of group actions under the EPA. It also deters many
women from joining cases because they may fear retaliation for stepping
forward, whereas being a class member under Rule 23 does not leave them
feeling so exposed.
This Article applies lessons from the Wal-Mart case to the quest for a
more effective remedy for unequal pay for equal work. Looking through
the lens of the Court’s decision, the Article explains the shortfalls of current
equal-pay laws and offers a blueprint for a more effective legal remedy for
pay discrimination. Part I summarizes Plaintiffs’ claims and the lower
courts’ class certification decisions. Part II analyzes the Court’s holding.
Part III explains why current federal statutory remedies for pay
discrimination—Title VII and the EPA—increasingly fail in the courts. It
also proposes amendments that would make the EPA and the proposed
Paycheck Fairness Act more compatible with the realities of pay
discrimination.
I.

Background About the Litigation
A. The Plaintiffs’ Claims

On June 16, 2001, six women who worked for Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.32
filed a complaint, on behalf of themselves and all women similarly
situated, in the United States District Court, Northern District of California,
in San Francisco. Plaintiffs alleged two types of sex discrimination under
Title VII: disparate treatment33 and disparate impact.34 Plaintiffs had two

29

Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Shattering the Equal Pay Act’s Glass Ceiling, 63 SMU L.
REV. 17, 37-41 (2010).
30 See id. at 57-61.
31 See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
32 Plaintiffs worked for both Wal-Mart stores and Sam’s Club stores throughout the United
States. Wal-Mart III, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2547-48 (2011).
33

Disparate treatment has been defined as ‚the most easily understood type of
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general contentions. They claimed, first, that women employed at WalMart ‚are paid less than men in comparable positions, despite having
higher performance ratings and greater seniority,‛35 and second, that
women ‚receive fewer promotions to in-store management positions than
do men, and those who are promoted must wait longer than their male
counterparts to advance.‛36 Plaintiffs alleged that ‚their local managers’
discretion over pay and promotions [was] exercised disproportionately in
favor of men, leading to an unlawful disparate impact on female
employees.‛37 In addition, ‚because Wal-Mart [was] aware of this effect, its
refusal to cabin its managers’ authority amount[ed] to disparate
treatment.‛38
Plaintiffs claimed that Wal-Mart’s discriminatory pay and promotion
practices resulted from the company’s highly subjective personnel system,
which placed substantial discretion in the hands of store managers. For
example, rather than post available promotional opportunities and
consider applicants based on objective job-related criteria, Wal-Mart used a
‚tap on the shoulder‛ system in which predominantly male ‚managers
ha[d] discretion about whose shoulders to tap.‛39 As a result of this system,
women ‚had no ability to apply for, or otherwise formally express their
interest in, openings as they arose,‛ and ‚[m]anagers did not have to
consider all interested and qualified candidates, thus further intensifying
the subjective nature of the promotion process.‛40
In addition, store managers exercised substantial discretion in setting
hourly pay rates. Wal-Mart left ‚open a $2 band for every position’s hourly
pay rate.‛41 The company provided ‚no standards or criteria for setting

discrimination. The employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of
their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.‛ Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
34 In a disparate-impact case, the plaintiff alleges that an otherwise neutral employment
practice has a discriminatory effect on a protected class. ‚*A+ plaintiff establishes a prima facie
disparate-impact claim by showing that the employer uses a particular employment practice
that causes a disparate impact on one of the prohibited bases‛ under Title VII. Lewis v. City of
Chi., 130 S. Ct. 2191, 2197 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., Watson v. Fort
Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 989-91 (1988); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433
U.S. 299, 301-04 (1977).
35 Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (Wal-Mart I), 222 F.R.D. 137, 141 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
36 Id.
37 Wal-Mart III, 131 S. Ct. at 2548.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 2563 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
40
41

Brief for Respondents, supra note 14, at 18 (quoting Wal-Mart I, 222 F.R.D. at 149).
Wal-Mart III, 131 S. Ct. at 2563 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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wages within that band, and thus [did] nothing to counter unconscious
bias on the part of supervisors.‛42 For example, a male ‚greeter‛ saying
hello to customers at the entrance, a male cashier scanning items at checkout, or a male stocker putting items on shelves, could make up to two
dollars more than female co-workers doing exactly the same job. As
women moved up the leadership ladder at Wal-Mart, both the level of
discretion in pay-setting and the gender pay gap increased dramatically.43
B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and Class Certification
Ten years after Plaintiffs filed suit, the merits of their claims have not
been addressed by any court. The preliminary procedural question facing
the Supreme Court was whether all women who worked for Wal-Mart
who were subjected to discriminatory pay and promotion practices could
proceed as a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedue 23. To understand
the Court’s decision and the arguments of the parties, some preliminary
background about class action requirements is in order.
A class action is typically used when multiple plaintiffs allege a similar
legal violation against the same defendant, and the costs of proceeding
individually would be too high, often because the individual plaintiffs’
claims are too low to attract competent counsel to bring the case. Class
actions promote judicial economy by allowing one court to decide common
questions of fact or law, rather than having thousands—or millions—of
separate lawsuits sprinkled throughout the country that may have
inconsistent results.44
In a class action, a handful of ‚named plaintiffs‛ on the complaint seek
to represent all absent class members who have similar claims against the
same defendant. If the class is certified, any judgment in the case will be
binding on all class members. To succeed on a motion for class certification
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedue 23, the representative plaintiffs must
first show that they satisfy four threshold requirements: (1) numerosity; 45
(2) commonality;46 (3) typicality;47 and (4) adequacy of representation.48

42

Id.
See infra notes 60-76 and accompanying text.
44 James M. Finberg, Class Actions: Useful Devices that Promote Judicial Economy and Provide
Access to Justice, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 353, 353 (1997); see also Rachel Tallon Pickens, Too Many
Riches?: Dukes v. Wal-Mart and the Efficacy of Monolithic Class Actions, 83 U. DET. MERCY L.
REV. 71, 73 (2006) (‚*C+lass actions encourage judicial economy and maximize efficiency by
preventing duplicative lawsuits and preventing inconsistent adjudications.‛).
43

45

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1) (stating that one or more members may sue or be sued as class
representative if ‚the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable‛).
46 Id. at 23(a)(2) (stating that one or more members may sue or be sued as class
representative if ‚there are questions of law or fact common to the class‛).
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If these four prerequisites are satisfied, the court may certify one of
three types of class actions. First, a court may certify a class under Rule
23(b)(1) if it finds that ‚prosecuting separate actions by or against
individual class members would create a risk of‛ either inconsistent
verdicts or standards of conduct for the defendant opposing the class 49 or
verdicts that could ‚substantially impair or impede‛ the rights of others
who are not parties to the individual litigation.50 Second, a court may
certify a class under Rule 23(b)(2) if ‚the party opposing the class has acted
or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final
injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate
respecting the class as a whole.‛51 Finally, a class may be certified under
Rule 23(b)(3) if ‚the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to
class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for
fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.‛52
A class certified under Rule 23(b)(3) has greater protections for absent
class members. Whereas ‚the court may direct appropriate notice to the
class‛ under Rule (b)(1) or (b)(2) ,53 ‚the court must direct to class members
the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances‛ for a (b)(3)

47

Id. at 23(a)(3) (stating that one or more members may sue or be sued as class
representative if ‚the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims
or defenses of the class‛).
48 Id. at 23(a)(4) (stating that one or more members may sue or be sued as class
representative if ‚the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of
the class‛).
49

Id. at 23(b)(1)(A); see, e.g., Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966
Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 388 (1967) (footnotes
omitted) (‚*This rule+ takes in cases where the party is obliged by law to treat the members of
the class alike ([e.g.,] a utility acting toward customers; a government imposing a tax), or
where the party must treat all alike as a matter of practical necessity ([e.g.,] a riparian owner
using water as against downriver owners).‛).
50 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B); see, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614
(1997) (‚Rule 23(b)(1)(B) includes, for example, ‘limited fund’ cases, instances in which
numerous persons make claims against a fund insufficient to satisfy all claims.‛).
51 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2); see, e.g., Amchem Prods., 521 U.S. at 614 (‚Civil rights cases against
parties charged with unlawful, class-based discrimination are prime examples [of actions
brought under this Rule+.‛).
52 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); see Amchem Prods., 521 U.S. at 615 (explaining that the
‚predominance‛ and ‚superiority‛ requirements were added to Rule 23(b)(3) ‚to cover cases
‘in which a class action would achieve economies of time, effort, and expense, and promote . .
. uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural
fairness or bringing about other undesirable results.’‛ (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory
committee’s note subdivision (b)(3) (1966))).
53

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A) (emphasis added).
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class.54 Any judgment in a class case will apply to all class members—
whether they are named plaintiffs or absent class members. 55 The notice
requirement for Rule 23(b)(3) classes advises absent class members that any
judgment will be binding on them and allows them to ‚opt out‛ or request
that they be excluded from the class. 56
C. Class Action in Wal-Mart
The core questions before the Court in Wal-Mart were: (1) Was the class
properly certified under Rule 23(b)(2) given the substantial claims for
backpay;57 and (2) Did the class satisfy the threshold requirement of
‚commonality‛?58 Plaintiffs argued that their claims for backpay could be
certified under Rule 23(b)(2) because backpay is an equitable remedy that
was incidental in nature to the injunctive and declaratory relief sought. 59
Plaintiffs presented three different types of evidence to establish
commonality of the class members’ claims: statistical evidence, socialframework testimony, and anecdotal reports of bias and gender
stereotyping.
1.

Statistical Evidence

To demonstrate ‚common questions‛ about gender disparities in pay
and promotions throughout the company, Plaintiffs presented the expert
testimony of a statistician, Dr. Richard Drogin.60 Dr. Drogin analyzed WalMart’s payroll and personnel data. He conducted statistical regressions for
hourly and salaried employees, controlling for a variety of factors such as:
‚gender, length of time with the company, number of weeks worked
during the year, whether the employee was hiring [sic] or terminated
during the year, full-time or part-time, which store the employee worked
in, whether the employee was ever hired into a management position, job
position, and job review ratings.‛61 Dr. Drogin found that ‚in every one of
Wal-Mart’s 41 regions women were paid significantly less than men, and
this pay gap increased each year.‛62 The data showed that more women

54

Id. at 23(c)(2)(B) (emphasis added).
Id. at 23(c)(3)(B).
56 Id. at 23(c)(2)(B)(v)-(vii).
57 See Wal-Mart III, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2547 (2011).
58 See id.
59 Id. at 2560.
60 See generally Declaration of Dr. Richard Drogin Ph.D in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Class Certification, Wal-Mart I, 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (No. C-01-2252 MJJ), 2003 WL
24571702 [hereinafter Drogin Declaration].
55

61
62

Wal-Mart I, 222 F.R.D. at 159 (citing Drogin Declaration, supra note 60, ¶¶ 67-71).
Brief for Respondents, supra note 14, at 22.
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than men worked for Wal-Mart and that women overall had more seniority
(4.47 years) than men (3.13 years). 63 On average, women in hourly positions
also had higher performance ratings (3.91) than their male counterparts
(3.84).64 Nevertheless, Dr. Drogin found that men performing the same
hourly jobs as women had higher hourly rates and that the pay gap
increased over time.65 For example, he found that such men earned $0.35
more per hour when hired, but that gap increased to $1.16 per hour on
average over a five-year period.66 Plaintiffs also argued that certain lowerpaid departments were female-dominated, and certain higher-paid
departments were male dominated.67 Significantly, prior to Plaintiffs’ suit,
Wal-Mart’s pay guidelines did not identify ‚department‛ as a factor to be
considered in setting pay, and employees had the same job titles for clerks
working in all departments.
Overall, Dr. Drogin found that ‚women earned about $5,200 less than
men, on the average, in 2001. Within the hourly workforce, women earned
about $1,100 less than men, and about $14,500 less among management
employees, in 2001.‛68 Plaintiffs presented the following chart from Dr.
Drogin’s analysis that shows the disparities in average earnings between
men and women performing the same jobs69:

63

Drogin Declaration, supra note 60, ¶ 28, at 18 tbl.12.
Id. ¶ 30, at 19 tbl.13.
65 Brief for Respondents, supra note 14, at 22.
66 Drogin Declaration, supra note 60, ¶ 33.
67 Wal-Mart I, 222 F.R.D. 137, 147 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (citing Drogin Declaration, supra note 60,
¶ 23, at 13-14 tbl.7).
64

68

Drogin Declaration, supra note 60, ¶ 20.
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification & Memorandum of Points and Authorities at
26, Wal-Mart I, 222 F.R.D. 137 (No. C-01-2252 MJJ) *hereinafter Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class
Certification] (citing Drogin Declaration, supra note 60, ¶¶ 25-26, at 16-17 tbls.9 & 10).
69
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Average Earnings by Gender for 2001
Job

Men

Women

Difference

Regional Vice Pres.

$419,435

$279,772

$139,663

District Manager

$239,519

$177,149

$62,370

Store Manager

$105,682

$89,280

$16,402

Co-Manager

$59,535

$56,317

$3218

Asst. Manager

$39,790

$37,322

$2468

Mgmt. Trainee

$23,175

$22,371

$804

Dept. Head

$23,518

$21,709

$1809

Sales Associate

$16,526

$15,067

$1459

Cashier

$14,525

$13,831

$694

Dr. Drogin found a statistically significant ‚gender hierarchy‛ at WalMart, with women disproportionately employed in lower-paying hourly
jobs in each of Wal-Mart’s forty-one regions.70 Women performed about
65% of the hourly jobs, but they held only 33% of the management
positions.71 This imbalance was particularly striking because a large
percentage of store management was promoted from within the hourly
ranks. Dr. Drogin found a statistically significant shortfall of women who
were promoted to each category of management positions in all of WalMart’s regions.72 For those women who were promoted, it took them
longer to move up the ladder: It took men, on average, 2.86 years from date
of hire to be promoted to assistant manager as compared to 4.38 years for
women.73 To reach store manager, women on average took 10.12 years
from hire date, compared with 8.64 years from hire for male employees. 74
To rebut any suggestion that women were simply less interested in
working in management positions,75 Plaintiffs also presented the testimony

70

Drogin Declaration, supra note 60, ¶ 77(a).
Id. ¶ 19.
72 Wal-Mart I, 222 F.R.D. at 160-61 (citing Drogin Declaration, supra note 60, ¶ 63).
73 Id. at 161 (citing Drogin Declaration, supra note 60, ¶ 29).
74 Id.
75 Employers frequently argue that women are poorly represented in certain types of jobs
because they lack interest in the positions. For analysis of the ‚lack of interest‛ defense in Title
VII cases, see generally Vicki Schultz & Stephen Petterson, Race, Gender, Work, and Choice: An
Empirical Study of the Lack of Interest Defense in Title VII Cases Challenging Job Segregation, 59 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1073 (1992) and Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial
Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest
71
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of labor economist Marc Bendick, who found that Wal-Mart seriously
lagged behind other retail stores in terms of representation of women in
management positions. He conducted a benchmarking analysis for the
period 1975-2002 and found that Wal-Mart had a consistent shortfall in
female managerial representation in every year examined.76 Dr. Bendick
concluded: ‚The scale, pervasiveness, persistence, and consistency of
under-representation of women among Wal-Mart’s managers suggests that
such under-representation is deeply rooted in the organization’s corporate
culture and the company-wide employment attitudes, policies and
practices that reflect and maintain that culture.‛77 In fact, Wal-Mart had
conducted its own internal benchmarking studies, which showed that as
compared to its retail competitors, ‚Wal-Mart had a ‘gap’ of 3324 women
managers.‛78
2.

Social Framework Testimony

Plaintiffs also presented evidence of a social-science expert, Dr.
William Bielby.79 Dr. Bielby testified ‚that Wal-Mart’s strong centralized
common culture sustained uniformity of decision-making, that its highly
subjective system was vulnerable to sexual stereotyping, and that its
diversity policies failed to mitigate the effect of stereotyping.‛80 He further
explained social-science research demonstrates that subjective decision
making permits gender stereotypes to influence personnel decisions
because discretion allows ‚people to ‘seek out and retain stereotypingconfirming information and ignore or minimize information that defies
stereotypes.’‛81 He found that at Wal-Mart ‚managers make decisions with
considerable discretion and little oversight.‛82 He concluded that such
subjective pay and promotion decisions ‚are likely to be biased ‘unless
they are assessed in a systematic and valid manner, with clear criteria and
careful attention to the integrity of the decision-making process.’‛83 Based
on a review of the depositions of managers and Wal-Mart’s personnel
Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749 (1990).
76 Declaration of Marc Bendick, Jr. Ph.D in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class
Certification ¶ 52, at 25, Wal-Mart I, 222 F.R.D. 137 (No. C-01-2252 MJJ), 2003 WL 24571703
[hereinafter Bendick Declaration].
77

Id. ¶ 67, at 32.
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification, supra note 69, at 31.
79 See generally Declaration of William T. Bielby, Ph.D in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Class Certification, Wal-Mart I, 222 F.R.D. 137 (No. C-01-2252 MJJ), 2003 WL 24571701
[hereinafter Bielby Declaration].
78

80
81
82
83

Brief for Respondents, supra note 14, at 7.
Wal-Mart I, 222 F.R.D. at 153 (quoting Bielby Declaration, supra note 79, ¶ 34, at 19-20).
Id. (quoting Bielby Declaration, supra note 79, ¶¶ 37-41, at 21-24).
Id. (quoting Bielby Declaration, supra note 79, ¶ 39, at 23).

EISENBERG - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

244

New England Law Review

2/1/2012 3:02 PM

v. 46 | 229

policies, Dr. Bielby concluded:
In sum, consistent with the organizational research on this topic,
Wal-Mart’s distinctive corporate culture is sustained by focused
efforts of the firm through on-going training and socialization,
communication specifically designed to reinforce its distinctive
elements, promotion from within and relocating managers from
store to store, and shared experiences among employees that
build commitment to shared beliefs and values. As a result of
these efforts, employees achieve a common understanding of the
company’s ways of conducting business.84

The district court found that ‚Dr. Bielby’s testimony raise[d] an
inference of corporate uniformity and gender stereotyping that is common
to all class members.‛85
3.

Anecdotal Reports of Bias and Gender Stereotyping

In addition to expert testimony, Plaintiffs submitted declarations of 120
women who worked at Wal-Mart stores throughout the nation. These
declarations testified ‚to being paid less than similarly situated men, being
denied promotion or being delayed in promotion in a disproportionate
manner compared with similarly situated men, working in an atmosphere
with a strong corporate culture, and being subjected to various individual
sexist acts.‛86 The women reported that managers told them—sometimes in
especially sexist terms—that retail management was not an appropriate job
for women.87 Wal-Mart imposed certain requirements for promotion that

84

Id. at 152 (quoting Bielby Declaration, supra note 79, ¶ 21, at 12).
Id. at 154.
86 Id. at 165-66.
87 A footnote in the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification summarized some of these
stereotypical comments about the appropriateness of women for managerial positions:
85

See, e.g., Durfey Decl. at ¶ 10 (a female assistant manager in Utah was
told repeatedly by a store manager that retail is ‚tough‛ and not
‚appropriate‛ for women); Scott Decl. at ¶¶ 8, 9, 12 (male store manager
told Scott that ‚*m+en are here to make a career and women aren’t. Retail
is for housewives who just need to earn extra money‛); Mathis Decl. at ¶
12 (male store manager told female associate that women have to be
‚bitches‛ to survive in Wal-Mart management); Kwapnoski Decl. at ¶ 16
(female receiving area manager told by store manager to ‚doll-up,‛ dress
a little better and ‚blow the cobwebs off *her+ make-up‛); Lovejoy Decl. at
¶ 6 (male area manager told female associate that she could not get
promoted to the overnight supervisor position because she had children
and because she would be the only woman working overnight); Zumbrun
Decl. at ¶ 5 (during interview for ICS team leader, male assistant manager
asked her, ‚*b+eing a female, what makes you more qualified for this job
than a male employee?‛ She was also told that the ICS staff was mostly
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adversely impacted women, including a relocation requirement,
participation in hunting retreats, and attendance at management meetings
at Hooters or strip clubs.88 Women reported being called ‚little Janie Qs‛
and ‚girls.‛89 They also cited instances in which supervisors told them that
women received lower pay because men deserved more money to support
their families.90

male and that they might have a problem with a female boss; male was
hired); Donovan Decl. at ¶ 6 (male manager told her ‚you aren't part of
the boy’s club, and you should raise a family and stay in the kitchen‛
instead of seeking advancement); Martin Decl. at ¶ 13 (told by male comanager, ‚you need to grow some balls‛); Rajas Decl. at ¶ 5 (male district
manager told her to resign as an Assistant Manager and find a husband
with whom she could settle down to relieve work-related stress); Deno
Dep. at 166:15-167:7, 234:2-236:6, Ex. 69 (male manager said women only
made store manager to meet a quota, that women should be home
barefoot and pregnant and women weren’t qualified to be managers
because men had an extra rib).
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification, supra note 69, at 16 n.9.
88 See Declaration of Melissa Howard in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class
Certification ¶¶ 14, 17-19, Wal-Mart I, 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (No. C-01-2252 MJJ),
available at www.walmartclass.com/staticdata/walmartclass/declarations/Howard_Melissa
.htm.
89 Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification, supra note 69, at 13.
90 Plaintiffs provided the following examples of women being told that they were being
paid less because of their sex:
Tallent Decl. at ¶ 10 (during department manager meeting, male store
manager said, ‚*m+en need to be paid more than women because they
have families to support‛); Young Decl. at ¶ 10 (during store meeting,
male assistant manager responded to question from female associate
about why men made more than women by stating that men were
working as heads of their households while women were just working for
the sake of working); Scott Decl. at ¶ 8 (when single mother personnel
manager asked why male associate was receiving a merit raise, male
assistant manager told her it was because he ‚has a family to support‛);
Kwapnoski Decl. at ¶ 12 (store manager told plaintiff that he gave male
associate larger raise because he had ‚a family to support‛); McDonald
Decl. at ¶ 7 (female associate told by male Department Manager that male
employees will always make more than females because ‚God made
Adam first, so women would always be second to men‛); Odle Decl. at
¶¶ 8, 10, 11 (when female assistant manager requested raises for two
female associates because they were making less than their male
counterparts, male general manager said, ‚*t+hose girls don't need any
more money; they make enough as it is.‛ She later asked why a male
assistant manager was making over $10,000 more than she was, male
director of operations told him it was because he ‚supports his wife and
his two kids‛); Brown Decl. at ¶ 5 (when she asked department manager
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Ultimately, Plaintiffs identified the following common questions of fact
and law:
(1) Does Wal-Mart have a largely subjective compensation and
promotion system; (2) Does that system result in lower pay and
fewer promotions for women; (3) Does Wal-Mart’s strong
corporate culture contribute to discrimination against women in
pay and promotion; (4) Which statistical analysis most accurately
measures the disparities between male and female employees; (5)
Was Wal-Mart’s senior management aware that its subjective
personnel system was resulting in adverse outcomes for women;
and (6) Can Wal-Mart’s subjective personnel system be justified
as a ‚business necessity‛ and, if so, were there ‚less
discriminatory alternatives‛?91

These common questions of fact formed the basis of Plaintiffs’ argument
for class certification.
D. The Lower Courts’ Decisions on Certification
After reviewing a voluminous record and holding hearings, the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California, in an eighty-four page
order, certified a class consisting of ‚[a]ll women employed at any WalMart domestic retail store at any time since December 26, 1998, who have
been or may be subjected to Wal-Mart’s challenged pay and management
track promotions policies and practices.‛92 The court modified the class in
two ways. First, it ‚excluded backpay claims based on promotion
opportunities that had not been publicly posted, for the reason that no
applicant data could exist for such positions.‛93 In addition, it ‚decided to
afford class members notice of the action and the right to ‚opt out‛ of the
class with respect to [the] punitive-damages claim.‛94
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, on rehearing
en banc, affirmed the district court’s certification order.95 The majority
found that Plaintiffs’ evidence ‚raise[d] the common question whether
Wal-Mart’s female employees nationwide were subjected to a single set of
corporate policies (not merely a number of independent discriminatory
acts) that may have worked to unlawfully discriminate against them in

about why her pay was lower than a less qualified male, manager said,
‚*y+ou don’t have the right equipment . . . you aren’t male, so you can’t
expect to be paid the same.‛).
Id. at 17-18 n.10.
91
92
93
94
95

Brief for Respondents, supra note 14, at 15 (citations omitted).
Wal-Mart I, 222 F.R.D. at 188.
Wal-Mart III, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2549 n.3 (2011) (citing Wal-Mart I, 222 F.R.D. at 182).
Id. (citing Wal-Mart I, 222 F.R.D. at 173).
Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (Wal-Mart II), 603 F.3d 571, 577 (9th Cir. 2010).
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violation of Title VII.‛96 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the certification of
Plaintiffs’ backpay claims under Rule 23(b)(2) but adjusted the class in two
ways. First, the court ‚remanded that part of the certification order which
included [Plaintiffs’] punitive-damages claim in the (b)(2) class, so that the
District Court might consider whether that might cause the monetary relief
to predominate.‛97 Second, in response to Wal-Mart’s argument that class
members who no longer worked at Wal-Mart lacked standing to seek
injunctive and declaratory relief, it excluded ‚those putative class members
who were no longer Wal-Mart employees at the time Plaintiffs’ complaint
was filed.‛98
II. The Supreme Court’s Decision
A. Monetary Claims May Not Be Certified Under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(b)(2).
The Court unanimously held that claims for monetary relief may not
be certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2).99 This provision
permits class certification when ‚the party opposing the class has acted or
refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final
injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate
respecting the class as a whole.‛100
Instead, the Court instructed that claims for individualized monetary
relief are more appropriately certified under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(b)(3), which provides greater procedural protections.101
Whereas a class certified under Rule 23(b)(2) is ‚mandatory‛—meaning
that individual class members do not receive notice and an opportunity to
‚opt out‛ of the action—a class certified under Rule 23(b)(3) requires that
class members receive ‚the best notice that is practicable under the
circumstances‛ and the opportunity to ‚opt out‛ of the case and pursue (or
not pursue) their own action.102 The Court stated that ‚[i]n the context of a
class action predominately for money damages we have held that absence
of notice and opt out violates due process.‛103
The Court rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that the backpay claims could
be certified under Rule 23(b)(2) because they did not ‚predominate‛ over

96

Id. at 612 (emphasis omitted).
Wal-Mart III, 131 S. Ct. at 2550 n.4 (citing Wal-Mart II, 603 F.3d at 621).
98 Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Wal-Mart I, 603 F.3d at 623).
99 Wal-Mart III, 131 S. Ct. at 2561.
100 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).
101 Wal-Mart III, 131 S. Ct. at 2558.
102 See id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B)).
103 Id. at 2559 (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985)).
97
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their requests for injunctive and declaratory relief.104 The Court concluded
that even if the injunctive claim under Rule 23(b)(2) predominated over the
monetary claims, the procedural protections in Rule 23(b)(3) for monetary
claims are still required.105 It cautioned that Plaintiffs’ ‚predominance test‛
would also create a ‚perverse incentive[] for class representatives to place
at risk potentially valid claims for monetary relief.‛106 In the district court,
for example, Plaintiffs did not assert claims for compensatory damages. 107
The Ninth Circuit had also limited the class to those women employed at
Wal-Mart as of the filing date of the complaint to ensure that all plaintiffs
had standing to seek injunctive or declaratory relief and that backpay
claims did not predominate. 108 The Court rejected such procedural
wrangling to try to squeeze the class under Rule 23(b)(2) rather than Rule
23(b)(3).109
The Court rested its holding largely on the due process rights of the
employer under Title VII, stating that ‚Wal-Mart is entitled to
individualized determinations of each employee’s eligibility for
backpay.‛110 The Court reviewed Title VII’s ‚detailed remedial scheme,‛
which affords the defendant the opportunity to ‚show that it took an
adverse employment action against an employee for any reason other than
discrimination.‛111 The Court stated that if a plaintiff makes a showing of
discrimination in a Title VII pattern-and-practice case, the defendant then
has ‚the right to raise any individual affirmative defenses it may have, and
to ‘demonstrate that the individual applicant was denied an employment
opportunity for lawful reasons.’‛112
The Court held that the Ninth Circuit erred in replacing individualized
determinations of all potential defenses with ‚Trial by Formula.‛113 The
Ninth Circuit had approved a sampling procedure to determine damages
based on a prior ruling in Hilao v. Estate of Marcos.114 The Court described
the ‚Trial by Formula‛ process as follows:
A sample set of the class members would be selected, as to whom
liability for sex discrimination and the backpay owing as a result

104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114

Id. at 2559, 2561.
See id. at 2559.
Id.
Wal-Mart III, 131 S. Ct. at 2559.
See id. at 2559-60.
Id. at 2560.
See id.
Id. at 2560-61.
Id. at 2561 (quoting Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 362 (1977)).
Wal-Mart III, 131 S. Ct. at 2561.
103 F.3d 767, 786 (9th Cir. 1996).
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would be determined in depositions supervised by a master. The
percentage of claims determined to be valid would then be
applied to the entire remaining class, and the number of
(presumptively) valid claims thus derived would be multiplied
by the average backpay award in the sample set to arrive at the
entire
class
recovery—without
further
individualized
proceedings.115

The Court rejected the sampling method for determining damages
‚[b]ecause the Rules Enabling Act forbids interpreting Rule 23 to ‘abridge,
enlarge or modify any substantive right.’‛116 The Court concluded that ‚a
class cannot be certified on the premise that Wal-Mart will not be entitled
to litigate its statutory defenses to individual claims.‛117 In other words, a
representative sampling of trials would deny Wal-Mart its substantive
right under Title VII to proffer legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for
every alleged act of discrimination. And because individualized trials
would be required for all 1.5 million members of the class, the Court held
that the backpay claims could not be ‚incidental‛ to the injunctive and
declaratory relief.118 Therefore, the class could not be certified under Rule
23(b)(2).119
B. Divergent Views on Commonality
In a 5-4 vote, the Court split on whether Plaintiffs satisfied the
threshold class prerequisite of ‚commonality.‛ Prior to the Court’s decision
in Wal-Mart, the requirement to show ‚commonality‛ among members of a
class was not considered onerous.120 The district court identified, and the
Ninth Circuit affirmed, a common question: ‚Whether Wal-Mart’s pay and

115

Wal-Mart III, 131 S. Ct. at 2561 (citing Wal-Mart II, 603 F.3d 571, 625-27 (9th Cir. 2010)).
Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006)).
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id. The Court did not address the more formulaic approach that the plaintiffs and the
district court had suggested based on Domingo v. New England Fish Co., 727 F.2d 1429, 1444
(9th Cir. 1984). The Domingo approach takes individualized data about every person in the
class and calculates individualized damages based on objective data. Id. In contrast, the
sampling approach disapproved by the Court takes a subset of members of the class and tries
damages for them, then applies the results of those trials to other class members. Wal-Mart III,
131 S. Ct. at 2561.
116

120

See, e.g., Baby Neal ex rel. Kanter v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 56 (3d Cir. 1994) (citations
omitted) (‚The commonality requirement will be satisfied if the named plaintiffs share at least
one question of fact or law with the grievances of the prospective class. . . . Because the
[commonality] requirement may be satisfied by a single common issue, it is easily met . . . .‛);
Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., 782 F.2d 468, 472 (5th Cir. 1986) (‚The threshold of ‘commonality’
is not high.‛); 1 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 3:10, at
274-77 & n.9 (4th ed. 2002) (explaining commonality ‚is easily met in most cases‛).
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promotions policies gave rise to unlawful discrimination.‛121 In her dissent,
Justice Ginsburg agreed that this question was sufficient to establish
‚commonality‛ based on extensive evidence presented by Plaintiffs ‚that
gender bias suffused Wal-Mart’s company culture.‛122
A majority of the Court disagreed, holding that Plaintiffs had failed to
establish sufficient commonality under Rule 23(a)(2).123 Justice Scalia wrote
that ‚Rule 23 does not set forth a mere pleading standard‛124 but requires a
‚rigorous analysis‛ to ensure that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been
satisfied.125 This frequently ‚will entail some overlap with the merits of the
plaintiff’s underlying claim.‛126 In particular, ‚proof of commonality
necessarily overlaps with‛ the merits in a case alleging a ‚pattern or practice
of discrimination.‛127 The Court explained that the interrelationship
between the merits and commonality existed ‚because, in resolving an
individual’s Title VII claim, the crux of the inquiry is ‘the reason for a
particular employment decision.’‛128
In other words, the majority held that the very nature of a pattern-orpractice Title VII claim requires a more rigorous commonality inquiry.
Plaintiffs must not simply show common questions, but common answers to
those questions.129 Justice Scalia wrote:
[Plaintiffs] wish to sue about literally millions of employment
decisions at once. Without some glue holding the alleged reasons
for all those decisions together, it will be impossible to say that
examination of all the class members’ claims for relief will
produce a common answer to the crucial question why was I
disfavored.130

As Wal-Mart had urged in its brief, the Court adopted a phrase from a
footnote in General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcon 131 as the standard for
121

Wal-Mart III, 131 S. Ct. at 2564 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2563.
123 Id. at 2556-57 (majority opinion).
124 Id. at 2551.
125 Id. (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982)).
126 Id.
127 Wal-Mart III, 131 S. Ct. at 2552 (emphasis in original).
128 Id. (quoting Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867, 876 (1984)).
129 See id. at 2551 (quoting Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate
Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 132 (2009)).
130 Id. at 2552.
131 457 U.S. 147 (1982). In Falcon, a Mexican-American employee alleged that his employer
did not promote him because of his race. Id. at 149. He sought class certification of MexicanAmerican applicants who had applied for employment with the defendant but who were not
hired. Id. at 151. Without an evidentiary hearing, the district court certified a class of both
Mexican-American employees and applicants who had not been hired. Id. at 152. The Court
122
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commonality: Plaintiffs must show that the employer ‚used a biased
testing procedure‛ or advance ‚[s]ignificant proof that an employer
operated under a general policy of discrimination.‛132 The Court held that
Plaintiffs could not show Wal-Mart used a ‚biased testing procedure‛
because ‚Wal-Mart has no testing procedure or other company-wide
evaluation method that can be charged with bias.‛133
Plaintiffs argued that Wal-Mart’s uniform policy of permitting
excessive managerial discretion over pay and promotions—when the
company knew it was having a discriminatory effect on female
employees—was an employment policy and practice sufficient to establish
commonality. The majority rejected the notion that Wal-Mart’s subjective
decision-making process could establish commonality, stating: ‚On its face,
of course, that is just the opposite of a uniform employment practice that
would provide the commonality needed for a class action; it is a policy
against having uniform employment practices.‛134 The Court blessed
discretionary personnel systems as ‚a very common and presumptively
reasonable way of doing business—one that we have said should itself
raise no inference of discriminatory conduct.‛135
The majority recognized that a system of unchecked discretion can
establish Title VII disparate impact liability because ‚an employer’s
undisciplined system of subjective decision making [can have] precisely
the same effects as a system pervaded by impermissible intentional
discrimination.‛136 But the Court found that using a policy of discretionary

held that the plaintiff had failed to show sufficient commonality between his failure-topromote claim and the potential claims of applicants who were not hired. Id. at 158. In a
footnote, Justice Stevens wrote:
If [the employer had] used a biased testing procedure to evaluate both
applicants for employment and incumbent employees, a class action on
behalf of every applicant or employee who might have been prejudiced
by the test clearly would satisfy the commonality and typicality
requirements of Rule 23(a). Significant proof that an employer operated under
a general policy of discrimination conceivably could justify a class of both
applicants and employees if the discrimination manifested itself in hiring
and promotion practices in the same general fashion, such as through
entirely subjective decisionmaking processes.
Id. at 159 n.15 (emphasis added).
132

Wal-Mart III, 131 S. Ct. at 2553 (quoting Falcon, 457 U.S. at 159 n.15) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
133 Id.
134 Id. at 2554.
135 Id. (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990 (1988)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
136

Id. (quoting Watson, 487 U.S. at 990-91) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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decision making to unite a class was internally inconsistent. 137 The majority
presumed that ‚left to their own devices most managers in any
corporation—and surely most managers in a corporation that forbids sex
discrimination—would select sex-neutral, performance-based criteria for
hiring and promotion that produce no actionable disparity at all.‛138 Even if
other managers relied on criteria that caused a disparate impact, and others
intentionally discriminated, the Court held that ‚demonstrating the
invalidity of one manager’s use of discretion will do nothing to
demonstrate the invalidity of another’s.‛139 Therefore, ‚[a] party seeking to
certify a nationwide class will be unable to show that all the employees’
Title VII claims will in fact depend on the answers to common
questions.‛140
In essence, the majority in Wal-Mart implicitly imported the intent
requirement from Title VII disparate treatment theory into the
commonality requirement of Rule 23. Even if the policy of discretion
adversely impacted women, the Court stated that Plaintiffs needed to
identify ‚a common mode of exercising discretion that pervade[d] the
entire company . . . .‛141 The Court tied this back to intentionality, finding
that ‚[i]n a company of Wal-Mart’s size and geographical scope, it is quite
unbelievable that all managers would exercise their discretion in a
common way without some common direction.‛142 In other words, the
Court rejected disparate impact because it was not convinced that a policy
of allowing discretion—at least on the nationwide level in a company of
Wal-Mart’s size—was really a ‚policy‛ in the same sense as policies
challenged in other disparate impact cases, such as a test or objective job
criterion, like minimum height or weight standards. 143 Moreover, even if it
was a common policy, every manager would likely exercise discretion

137

Id.
Wal-Mart III, 131 S. Ct. at 2554. The majority glaringly (but probably unconsciously) left
out ‚compensation‛ decisions from its statement that most managers ‚would select sexneutral, performance-based criteria for hiring and promotion that produce no actionable
disparity at all.‛ See id. Indeed, compensation decisions that are unguided by job-related,
performance-based criteria typically result in a greater gender wage gap. See infra Part III.A.
138

139

Wal-Mart III, 131 S. Ct. at 2554.
Id.
141 Id. at 2554-55.
142 Id. at 2555.
143 For examples of types of objective policies that have been challenged under disparate
impact theory, see Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 328-29 (1977) (challenging minimum
height and weight requirements as causing disparate impact against women) and Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 425-26 (1971) (challenging requirement of high school
education or passage of standardized general intelligence test as discriminatory condition of
employment).
140
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differently under the policy, thereby defeating commonality for a patternor-practice claim.
And what about Plaintiffs’ evidence that Wal-Mart’s system of
excessive, unchecked discretion led to stark pay disparities between men
and women who performed equal work? The majority concluded that
‚[m]erely showing that Wal-Mart’s policy of discretion has produced an
overall sex-based disparity does not suffice.‛144 Plaintiffs must identify a
‚‘specific employment practice’ . . . that ties all their 1.5 million claims
together.‛145
The Court criticized Dr. Bielby’s expert testimony that Wal-Mart’s
system of discretionary decision making and ‚strong corporate culture‛
made it ‚‘vulnerable’ to ‘gender bias.’‛146 The Court pointed out that ‚Dr.
Bielby conceded that he could not calculate whether 0.5 percent or 95
percent of the employment decisions at Wal-Mart might be determined by
stereotyped thinking.‛147 The Court suggested that Dr. Bielby’s testimony
might not satisfy the standards for expert testimony148 and noted that his
conclusions in the case had ‚elicited criticism from the very scholars on
whose conclusions he relie[d] for his social-framework analysis.‛149
Because Dr. Bielby could not specify how many employment decisions
were affected by stereotypes, Justice Scalia wrote, ‚we can safely disregard
what he has to say. It is worlds away from significant proof that Wal-Mart
operated under a general policy of discrimination.‛150
The Court also found Plaintiffs’ anecdotal evidence of sex-based
comments ‚too weak to raise any inference that all the individual,
discretionary personnel decisions are discriminatory.‛151 Although the
Court proclaimed that it was not adopting a rule that anecdotes must be
supplied in proportion to the size of the class,152 it noted that Plaintiffs’ 120
declarations of discrimination represented ‚about 1 for every 12,500 class
members—relating to only some 235 out of Wal-Mart’s 3,400 stores.‛153 In
144

Wal-Mart III, 131 S. Ct. at 2556.
Id. at 2555-56.
146 See id. at 2553 (quoting Wal-Mart I, 222 F.R.D. 137, 152, 154 (N.D. Cal. 2004)).
147 Id. (quoting Wal-Mart I, 222 F.R.D. at 192) (internal quotation marks omitted).
148 The district court held that the standards for expert testimony under Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), did not apply at the class-certification stage. Wal-Mart I,
222 F.R.D. at 191. The Court’s ‚doubt‛ that Daubert does not apply at the class-certification
stage, Wal-Mart III, 131 S. Ct. at 2554, will likely cause trial courts to require expert testimony
at the class certification stage to satisfy Daubert.
145

149
150
151
152
153

Wal-Mart III, 131 S. Ct. at 2553 n.8.
Id. at 2554 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 2556.
Id. at 2556 n.9.
Id. at 2556 (citing Wal-Mart II, 603 F.3d 571, 634 (9th Cir. 2010) (Ikuta, J., dissenting)).
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sum, ‚because [Plaintiffs] provide[d] no convincing proof of a companywide discriminatory pay and promotion policy, [the Court] concluded that
they have not established the existence of any common question.‛154
Plaintiffs therefore could not proceed as a class.
As Judge Ginsburg expressed in her dissent, it is difficult to square the
Court’s ruling with its prior decision in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust,
which ‚held that ‘discretionary employment practices’ can give rise to Title
VII claims, not only when such practices are motivated by discriminatory
intent but also when they produce discriminatory results.‛155 Watson
explicitly stated that an employer’s ‚undisciplined system of subjective
decision making was an employment practic[e] that may be analyzed
under the disparate impact approach.‛156 Judge Ginsburg concluded that
‚[t]he evidence reviewed by the District Court adequately demonstrated
that resolving those claims would necessitate examination of particular
policies and practices alleged to affect, adversely and globally, women
employed at Wal-Mart’s stores,‛ and the commonality requirement in Rule
23(a)(2) ‚demands nothing further.‛157
Perhaps the majority’s bastardization of Watson and heightened focus
on the dissimilarities among plaintiffs working in many stores across the
nation boils down to the Court’s perception that mega-class actions are too
unwieldy for employers to defend. Of course, plaintiffs are likely to simply
split their class down into smaller cases to ensure they are linked more
myopically by region, store, or manager. Breaking the case into bite-sized
bits should address the majority’s commonality concerns. But having
multiple class actions involving the same employment practice will
undermine judicial economy, raise litigation costs for all involved, and lead
to the risk of inconsistent verdicts. Indeed, such concerns motivated the
creation of Rule 23.
Aside from the impact that Wal-Mart will have on class action practice,
the majority’s opinion is riddled with dicta that reflects implicit hostility to
pay-discrimination claims more generally. Despite Plaintiffs’ rich statistical
evidence of dramatic gender pay disparities, and examples of explicit sex
bias by some managers, the majority simply could not believe that WalMart discriminated so profoundly and pervasively, at least not in a way
that was common to a national class. The next Part explores what Wal-Mart
teaches us about the legal quest for equal pay.

154

Id. at 2556-57.
Wal-Mart III, 131 S. Ct. at 2564-65 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Watson v. Fort Worth
Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 988, 991 (1988)).
155

156
157

Id. at 2565 (quoting Watson, 487 U.S. at 990-91) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
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III. Lessons for the Legal Quest for Equal Pay
The Wal-Mart case demonstrates the uphill battle that plaintiffs often
have in proving pay discrimination. In response to the Wal-Mart decision,
some have called for legislative action.158 Congress has held hearings and
efforts have been renewed to pass the Paycheck Fairness Act to ensure that
women have an effective remedy to attack unequal pay for equal work. 159
But what should that remedy be?
The implicit narrative underlying the majority’s opinion in Wal-Mart
should be mined carefully before more litigation remedies are thrown at
the very real problem of gender-based pay disparities. Policymakers
should understand how unjustified pay disparities are likely to occur and
why current federal statutory remedies fail to address those disparities. The
Wal-Mart case offers several insights into these questions.
A. The Dynamics of Pay Discrimination in the Modern Workplace
The first insight from Wal-Mart is the tension between Title VII’s focus
on intent—and the Court’s emphasis on a ‚general policy of
discrimination‛ for commonality—with the economic realities of how most
pay discrimination happens in the modern workplace. The wages of
employees today are more likely to be the product of discretionary or
ambiguous pay regimes that do not have guiding criteria or, more
importantly, sufficient corporate oversight or governing standards. 160 In
fact, the gender-wage gap is the largest for women whose wages are the
product of individualized negotiation processes and greater discretion on
the part of the employer, including those at the higher end of the
occupational ladder—doctors, lawyers, and executives.161
158 See Beth Scott, Betty Dukes to U.S. Senate: The Best is Yet to Come!, AAUW DIALOG (June
30, 2011), http://blog-aauw.org/2011/06/30/betty-dukes-the-best-is-yet-to-come/ (noting that
Wal-Mart ‚underscores the need to strengthen our federal employment discrimination laws
through legislation like the Paycheck Fairness Act‛).
159 See Barriers to Justice and Accountability: How the Supreme Court’s Recent Rulings Will
Affect Corporate Behavior: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011)
[hereinafter Barriers to Justice and Accountability] (statement of Betty Dukes, Lead Plaintiff in
Wal-Mart, Inc. v. Dukes), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/11-6-29%20Dukes%20
Testimony.pdf.
160

Eisenberg, supra note 15, at 990 (‚In the absence of a professional compensation survey,
analyzed by a professional compensation consultant, ‘market wages’ are simply an
employer’s hunch about what the position is worth.‛).
161 See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, HIGHLIGHTS OF WOMEN’S
EARNINGS IN 2010, at 17 tbl.2 (2011) (representing that female physicians/surgeons earn 71% as
much as their male counterparts); id. at 15 tbl.2 (representing that female lawyers earn 77.1%
as much as their male counterparts); id. at 11 tbl.2 (representing that female chief executives
earn 72.1% as much as their male counterparts).
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The evidence in Wal-Mart reflected this trend. Plaintiffs challenged a
discretionary pay regime which led to dramatically different pay for men
and women performing identical hourly, unskilled jobs. The amount of the
pay gap increased for women in supervisory positions. For hourly workers
and mid-level supervisors, women earned between 91% and 96% as much
as men performing the same work. But, the gap widened dramatically at
the top: Female Store Managers made only 84% as much as male Store
Managers; female District Managers earned only 73% as much as their
male counterparts; and female Regional Vice Presidents made only 67% as
much.162
Extensive research shows that subjective, informal pay-setting
processes often lead to pay disparities between men and women. 163 For
example, in a peer-reviewed management study, supervisors at a
transportation company described female employees as experiencing
greater family-work conflict than men, regardless of women’s actual
caregiving duties. This caused supervisors to view women’s job fit,
performance, and promotional opportunities more negatively. 164 The
researchers found a ‚motherhood wage penalty‛ of approximately 5% for
one child and 7% for two or more children for female employees.165 In
another study of the starting salaries of men and women leaving medical
residency programs, that applied regression controls for multiple variables
that could potentially affect wages, male physicians made on average
$16,819 more than female physicians. 166
Justice Ginsburg, in her dissent, explained how discretionary pay
regimes can facilitate pay disparities between men and women:
The practice of delegating to supervisors large discretion to make
personnel decisions, uncontrolled by formal standards, has long
been known to have the potential to produce disparate effects.
Managers, like all humankind, may be prey to biases of which
they are unaware. The risk of discrimination is heightened when
those managers are predominantly of one sex, and are steeped in
a corporate culture that perpetuates gender stereotypes. 167

162

See Drogin Declaration, supra note 60, ¶¶ 25-26, at 16 & tbl.9.
See Eisenberg, supra note 15, at 971-82 (discussing statistics and multiple studies).
164 Sue Shellenbarger, The “Maternal Wall”: Employer Bias Against Working Women, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 3, 2009, available at http://blogs.wsj.com/juggle/2009/12/03/the-maternal-wall-employerbias-against-working-women/tab/print/.
163

165 See Deborah J. Anderson et al., The Motherhood Wage Penalty Revisited: Experience,
Heterogeneity, Work Effort, and Work-Schedule Flexibility, 56 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 273, 273-76
(2003).
166 Anthony T. LoSasso et al., The $16,819 Pay Gap for Newly Trained Physicians: The
Unexplained Trend of Men Earning More than Women, 30 HEALTH AFF. 193, 196 (2011).
167

Wal-Mart III, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2564 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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The majority conceded that discretionary pay systems can violate Title VII.
At the same time, its dicta blessed such systems as a ‚very common and
presumptively reasonable way of doing business.‛168 The Court’s opinion
may have the unintended consequence of causing more pay inequities in
American workplaces. Rather than developing pay regimes that are guided
by job-related and objective criteria, companies may move to more
subjective systems, with little centralized oversight, to avoid Title VII
liability for pay disparities.169 This would not be a wise human resources
strategy for other reasons: It can lower employee morale and productivity
and, as explained below, could subject the employer to liability under the
EPA, which does not permit subjective pay practices as defenses for pay
disparities. Given that Wal-Mart is a market leader, however, many
companies may follow its example of using discretionary pay regimes as a
risk-management strategy. As Betty Dukes and the other women working
at Wal-Mart can attest, this would be a disaster for the principle of equal
pay for equal work.
B. The Failure of Litigation Remedies to Address Structural Pay
Discrimination
1.

Title VII

In addition to providing an example of the systemic and dramatic
gender pay disparities that can result from excessively discretionary pay
regimes, Wal-Mart shows the difficulty involved in challenging structural
discrimination. Of course, the Court did not address the merits and was
considering only whether ‚commonality‛ existed for class certification
under Rule 23. Nevertheless, its decision that a common discriminatory
employment policy did not exist was grounded in the ‚detailed remedial
scheme‛ of Title VII itself, particularly for pattern-or-practice cases.170

168

Id. at 2554.
See Hart Testimony, supra note 9, at 3 (‚By making class action litigation of employment
discrimination claims less likely, the Wal-Mart decision also takes pressure off of employers to
adopt the best internal practices for ensuring that workplace decisions are made fairly and
without illegal stereotyping and bias.‛).
170 See Wal-Mart III, 131 S. Ct. at 2552. In a pattern-or-practice case, the plaintiffs first
‚establish by a preponderance of the evidence that . . . discrimination was the company’s
standard operating procedure*,+ the regular rather than the unusual practice.‛ Id. (quoting
Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977)). That prima facie ‚showing
will support a rebuttable inference that all class members were victims of the discriminatory
practice, and will justify ‘an award of prospective relief,’ such as ‘an injunctive order against
the continuation of the discriminatory practice.’‛ Id. at 2552 n.7 (quoting Teamsters, 431 U.S. at
361).
169
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Many plaintiffs lose Title VII pay discrimination cases because most
courts, like Justice Scalia and his brethren, presume the good faith of
businesses. Courts typically resist interfering with any type of
compensation decision—not only in the pay discrimination context, but
also in the area of executive compensation.171 In a Title VII pay
discrimination case, ‚smoking gun‛ evidence of sex-based animus is not
required,172 but plaintiffs are more likely to win if they have it.173
Certainly, at least some of the managers at Wal-Mart articulated such
sexist intentions. Plaintiffs reported that managers told them things like:
‚Men need to be paid more than women because they have families to
support‛; male employees would always make more because ‚God made
Adam first, so women would always be second to men‛; and ‚You don’t
have the right equipment. . . . [Y]ou aren’t male, so you can’t expect to be
paid the same.‛174 When one plaintiff asked her manager why a male coworker in the same position was making $10,000 more per year, the
manager told her to bring in her household budget so he could decide
whether she deserved as much as the man.175 The majority, however, could
not accept the notion that all managers of the 1.5 million women in the
class would likewise have the same discriminatory intent.
After Wal-Mart, a class of women alleging Title VII pattern-or-practice
pay discrimination must provide ‚convincing proof of a companywide

171 Eisenberg, supra note 15, at 999-1000 (discussing reluctance of courts to interfere with
compensation decisions in both executive compensation and pay discrimination cases); see also
DeJarnette v. Corning, Inc., 133 F.3d 293, 299 (4th Cir. 1998) (‚*T+his Court ‘does not sit as a
kind of super-personnel department weighing the prudence of employment decisions made
by firms charged with employment discrimination . . . .’‛ (quoting Giannopoulous v. Brach &
Brock Confections, Inc., 109 F.3d 406, 410 (7th Cir. 1997))); Shealy v. City of Albany, 89 F.3d
804, 806 n.6 (11th Cir. 1996) (‚The district judge does not sit as a sort of ‘super personnel
officer’‛ of the employer.).
172 Under Title VII’s burden-shifting scheme, a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of
pay discrimination by showing that she is similarly situated to a male employee and receives
less pay. The employer must then put forth a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the
disparate pay. Title VII does not put the burden on the employer to prove that this was the
actual reason for the unequal pay decision. After the employer offers a reason, the burden of
persuasion then shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the employer’s purported justification
was a mere ‚pretext‛ for discrimination and the real reason for the disparity was her sex. See
Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1981).
173 See, e.g., Brinkley-Obu v. Hughes Training, Inc., 36 F.3d 336, 340 (4th Cir. 1994)
(employer told plaintiff to be an engineer or a ‚mama‛).
174

See generally Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification, supra note 69 (providing examples
of sex-based explanations for pay disparities by Wal-Mart supervisors).
175 Barriers to Justice and Accountability, supra note 159, at 3-4, available at http://judiciary.
senate.gov/pdf/11-6-29%20Dukes%20Testimony.pdf.

EISENBERG - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2012

Lessons for the Legal Quest for Equal Pay

2/1/2012 3:02 PM

259

discriminatory pay and promotion policy.‛176 That policy may not simply
be a policy of discretion that has a discriminatory effect—it must be a
‚general policy of discrimination‛ in and of itself.177 The Court described
Wal-Mart’s policy of ‚allowing discretion by local supervisors over
employment matters‛ as ‚just the opposite of a uniform employment
practice that would provide the commonality needed for a class action; it is
a policy against having uniform employment practices.‛178
The plaintiffs in Wal-Mart also alleged ‚disparate impact‛ under Title
VII, which does not require a showing of intent. 179 The Court had
previously held that ‚an employer’s undisciplined system of subjective
decisionmaking [can have] precisely the same effects as a system pervaded
by impermissible intentional discrimination.‛180 Although disparate impact
sounds powerful in theory, it has been less potent in practice. 181 Even
before Wal-Mart, most plaintiffs lost disparate impact cases. 182 By holding
that the discretionary pay system at issue in Wal-Mart could not be a
‚general policy of discrimination‛ sufficient to establish commonality, the
Court has raised the bar for class certification of disparate impact claims.
2.

Equal Pay Act

If Betty Dukes and the women at Wal-Mart had filed an EPA claim
instead of a Title VII pay discrimination claim, the result may have been
different, at least for the pay claims. 183 The EPA offers several conceptual
176

Wal-Mart III, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2556 (2011).
Id. at 2553 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159 n.15 (1982)).
178 Id. at 2554.
179 See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (‚The Act proscribes not
only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in
operation.‛).
177

180

Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990-91 (1988).
Porter & Vartanian, supra note 20, at 181 (‚While some courts have addressed disparate
impact claims alleging pay discrimination, there remains uncertainty as to whether a
disparate impact claim is even cognizable for pay discrimination cases.‛); Elaine W. Shoben,
Disparate Impact Theory in Employment Discrimination: What’s Griggs Still Good For? What Not?,
42 BRANDEIS L.J. 597, 597 (2004) (‚Despite the heroic effort of Congress to keep the theory
from destruction by the Supreme Court through its express codification in 1991, disparate
impact litigation is not making a major impact in this new century.‛).
181

182

Melissa Hart, Disparate Impact Discrimination: The Limits of Litigation, The Possibilities for
Internal Compliance, 33 J.C. & U.L. 547, 549 (2007) (‚In the district courts, plaintiffs are
successful in about 25 percent of disparate impact cases; in the courts of appeals, plaintiffs fare
even worse, winning about 19 percent of the time on their disparate impact arguments.‛
(citing Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701, 738-39
(2006))).
183 The EPA only addresses pay disparities and not other types of employment actions. A
significant portion of the plaintiffs’ claims in Wal-Mart concerned failure-to-promote claims.
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advantages over Title VII as a remedy for disparate pay. ‚Intent‛ is
irrelevant under the EPA.184 The plaintiff must first ‚show that an
employer pays different wages to employees of opposite sexes ‘for equal
work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and
responsibility, and which are performed under similar working
conditions.’‛185 If the plaintiff makes this prima facie showing, the burden
of proof ‚shifts to the employer to show that the differential is justified
under one of the Act’s four exceptions.‛186 Unlike Title VII, the employer
must prove the actual reason for the pay disparity and cannot simply offer
post hoc, theoretical explanations.187 In addition, unlike Title VII, the
employer bears the ultimate burden of persuasion to prove the legality of
the pay disparity under the EPA. Finally, unlike Title VII, subjective pay
decisions are not acceptable defenses under the EPA.
It is not uncommon for plaintiffs to win EPA claims and lose Title VII
pay discrimination claims.188 The EPA’s framework is easier for juries and
judges to accept. Like Justice Scalia, most people would prefer to believe
that managers try to do the right thing and do not intend to discriminate
against women. Nevertheless, where pay disparities between workers
performing substantially equal jobs occur for whatever reason, and the
See Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification and Memorandum of Points and Authorities at
28-29, Wal-Mart III, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) (No. C-01-2252).
184 The EPA imposes ‚a form of strict liability on employers who pay males more than
females for performing the same work—in other words, the plaintiff . . . need not prove that
the employer acted with discriminatory intent.‛ See Mickelson v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 460 F.3d
1304, 1310-11 (10th Cir. 2006).
185 Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)
(2006)).
186 Id. at 196. The EPA’s affirmative defenses include: ‚(i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit
system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a
differential based on any other factor other than sex.‛ 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1).
187 See, e.g., Stanziale v. Jargowsky, 200 F.3d 101, 108 (3d Cir. 2000) (citation omitted)
(‚Thus, unlike an ADEA or Title VII claim, where an employer need not prove that the
proffered legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons actually motivated the salary decision . . . in
an Equal Pay Act claim, an employer must submit evidence from which a reasonable
factfinder could conclude that the proffered reasons actually motivated the wage disparity.‛).
188 See, e.g., King v. Univ. Healthcare Sys., L.C., 645 F.3d 713, 724 (5th Cir. 2011) (explaining
that it was not inconsistent for the jury to rule in favor of the plaintiff on the EPA claim, but
not on the Title VII claim, because ‚where the defendant proffers a reason for its pay
differential other than sex, but does not prove that reason by a preponderance of the evidence,
the plaintiff will succeed on an EPA claim while still bearing the burden of persuasion under
Title VII‛); Fallon v. Illinois, 882 F.2d 1206, 1217 (7th Cir. 1989) (‚It is possible that a plaintiff
could fail to meet its burden of proving a Title VII violation, and at the same time the
employer could fail to carry its burden of proving an affirmative defense under the Equal Pay
Act.‛); Brewster v. Barnes, 788 F.2d 985, 987 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding defendant liable for pay
discrimination under EPA but not under Title VII).
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employer cannot prove the imbalance is justified by reasonable businessrelated reasons, the EPA requires that the employer correct the problem.
Although the EPA offers a more streamlined litigation model, most
modern-day plaintiffs lose EPA claims for two major reasons. First, the
EPA’s ‚equal work‛ prima facie standard is more difficult for most women
to satisfy. As our economy moves away from standardized manufacturing
jobs to more flexible, fluid working arrangements, proving that two jobs
are ‚equal‛ has become a huge hurdle for most EPA plaintiffs. Women in
upper-level jobs—for whom the pay gap tends to be the largest—typically
cannot satisfy the EPA’s prima facie standard, which was developed for
lower-wage, assembly-line workers. An empirical study of EPA cases since
the Act’s passage found that employees are less likely to prevail on equal
pay claims today than during any other decade. 189 In addition, from 19992009 federal district courts granted summary judgment to the employer
72% of the time.190 Of course, for women working at Wal-Mart, the prima
facie standard under the EPA should be relatively easy to satisfy because
Wal-Mart’s positions are so standardized. There is little to no difference in
the ‚skill, responsibility, and effort‛ that would distinguish one greeter,
cashier, or store manager from another.191 But for most jobs in the modern
economy, cookie-cutter identity is rare and a more pragmatic prima facie
standard is needed.
The other stumbling block for many EPA plaintiffs is the catch-all
‚factor-other-than-sex‛ defense. This has increasingly become a loophole
under which employers may justify pay decisions. A majority of federal
circuits and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission have held
that this defense must be job-related and adopted for a legitimate business
reason.192 But some circuits have held that the factor-other-than-sex defense

189 See Eisenberg, supra note 29, at 33 tbl.1 (showing that employees prevailed on EPA
claims in federal courts of appeal cases 35% of the time from 2000-2009, as compared to 55%
from 1990-1999, 52% between 1980-1989, and 59% between 1970-1979). The author is updating
this research for a symposium about the overuse of summary judgment in employment cases
in April 2012 at New York Law School, the results of which will be published in the New York
Law Review.
190 Id. at 34.
191 Of course, Wal-Mart would likely argue that different departments mean different jobs,
but that defense has typically been rejected by courts in cases involving lower-wage hourly
workers. See, e.g., EEOC v. Shelby Cnty., 707 F. Supp. 969, 983 (W.D. Tenn. 1988) (holding that
a cashier and exhibit custodian were comparable despite differences in duties because ‚there
is little difference between the degree of responsibility required‛); Usery v. Johnson, 436 F.
Supp. 35, 38-42 (D.N.D. 1977) (holding sales clerks in different departments equal); Brennan v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 410 F. Supp. 84, 95 (D. Iowa 1976) (holding that division managers
performed equal work).
192

See Steger v. Gen. Elec. Co., 318 F.3d 1066, 1078-79 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation
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can be any reason at all.193 Vague defenses based on ‚market forces‛ have
been increasingly accepted by some courts, even though such defenses are
not acceptable under the EPA.
C. Blueprint for an Effective Legal Remedy for Unequal Pay
The Wal-Mart case highlights the Catch-22 that women face in trying to
address unjustified pay disparities in the workplace. They cannot challenge
discretionary pay regimes under Title VII because they typically lack
evidence of intentional discrimination.194 After Wal-Mart, they will have a

marks ommitted) (‚Because the evidence showed that the salary retention plan was justified
by special exigent circumstances connected with the business, . . . and because there was no
evidence which rebutted GE’s explanation, the district court did not err in submitting the
matter to the jury or in denying Steger’s motion for judgment as a matter of law.‛ (quoting
Irby v. Bittick, 44 F.3d 949, 955 (11th Cir. 1995))); Belfi v. Prendergast, 191 F.3d 129, 136 (2d Cir.
1999) (‚*T+o successfully establish the ‘factor other than sex’ defense, an employer must also
demonstrate that it had a legitimate business reason for implementing the gender-neutral
factor that brought about the wage differential.‛); Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 963
F.2d 520, 526 (2d Cir. 1992) (‚*A+n employer bears the burden of proving that a bona fide
business-related reason exists for using the gender-neutral factor that results in a wage
differential in order to establish the factor-other-than-sex defense.‛); EEOC v. J.C. Penney Co.,
843 F.2d 249, 253 (6th Cir. 1988) (‚*T+he ‘factor other than sex’ defense does not include
literally any other factor, but a factor that, at a minimum, was adopted for a legitimate
business reason.‛); Glenn v. Gen. Motors Corp., 841 F.2d 1567, 1571 (11th Cir. 1988) (‚*T+he
‘factor-other-than-sex’ exception applies when the disparity results from unique
characteristics of the same job; from an individual’s experience, training, or ability; or from
special exigent circumstances connected with the business.‛); Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 691
F.2d 873, 876 (9th Cir. 1982) (‚The Equal Pay Act concerns business practices. It would be
nonsensical to sanction the use of a factor that rests on some consideration unrelated to
business. An employer thus cannot use a factor which causes a wage differential between
male and female employees absent an acceptable business reason.‛); EEOC, Directives
Transmittal No. 915.003, § 10.IV.F.2 & nn.65-66 (Dec. 5, 2000), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/compensation.html#N_65 (‚An employer . . . must show
that the factor is related to job requirements or otherwise is beneficial to the employer’s
business [and] the factor must be used reasonably in light of the employer’s stated business
purpose as well as its other practices.‛).
193 See Taylor v. White, 321 F.3d 710, 719 (8th Cir. 2003) (‚In conducting this examination,
our concern is not related to the wisdom or reasonableness of the asserted defense. It is related
solely to the issue of whether the asserted defense is based on a factor other than sex.‛); Dey v.
Colt Constr. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1462 (7th Cir. 1994) (‚*T+he EPA’s fourth affirmative
defense is a broad catch-all exception [that] embraces an almost limitless number of factors, so
long as they do not involve sex. . . . The factor need not be related to the requirements of the
particular position in question, nor must it even be business-related.‛ (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
194

See Parada v. Great Plains Int’l of Sioux City, Inc., 483 F. Supp. 2d 777, 791 (N.D. Iowa
2007) (‚Employment discrimination and retaliation, except in the rarest cases, is difficult to
prove. It is perhaps more difficult to prove such cases today than during the early evolution of
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more difficult time banding together with coworkers to challenge
discretionary pay structures that have a disparate impact on female
employees without convincing proof that the discretion was exercised in a
common way. And if they sue under the EPA, they are likely to lose
because of either the strict prima facie standard or the catch-all ‚factorother-than-sex‛ defense.
To contribute to the discussion about whether and how policymakers
should respond to the Wal-Mart decision, this section proposes modified
legal approaches to discourage pay discrimination that may be more
effective and consistent with compensation practices in the modern-day
workplace.
1.

Incentives for Self-Regulation by Employers

The most effective way to eliminate unjustified pay disparities, of
course, is to convince employers to take proactive steps to eliminate them.
As argued in previous work, litigation tends to be an ineffective way to
address pay discrimination because litigation is reactive (by the time a
woman discovers a disparity, it has grown for years or decades), piecemeal
(even more so now that large classes of women will have more difficulty
joining together to challenge structural pay discrimination), and typically
unsuccessful (most plaintiffs lose their cases at the summary judgment
stage).195 The ultimate goal of statutory regimes like Title VII is to promote
voluntary remedial efforts by employers, not to encourage more
litigation.196 The Wal-Mart decision portends the opposite. With the Court’s
blessing of discretionary pay regimes as reasonable and virtually immune
from large-scale Title VII challenge, employers lack incentives to change
them. Indeed, employers may move to more discretionary pay regimes as a
shield against potential Title VII liability.
One way to convince employers to take pay disparities seriously
would be to require pay transparency in the workplace.197 This is not as
radical as it may sound. Some employers already have adopted an ‚openbook‛ management structure, which, they report, has cultivated greater
federal and state anti-discrimination and anti-retaliation laws. Today’s employers, even those
with only a scintilla of sophistication, will neither admit discriminatory or retaliatory intent,
nor leave a well-developed trail demonstrating it.‛).
195

See Eisenberg, supra note 15, at 970-71.
See Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 228 (1982) (‚To accomplish this objective *of
bringing employment discrimination to an end], the legal rules fashioned to implement Title
VII should be designed, consistent with other Title VII policies, to encourage Title VII
defendants promptly to make curative, unconditional job offers to Title VII claimants, thereby
bringing defendants into ‘voluntary compliance’ and ending discrimination far more quickly
than could litigation . . . .‛).
196

197

See Eisenberg, supra note 15, at 958.
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loyalty and productivity among employees.198 For decades, mandated
disclosure has been used to regulate executive compensation. The
underlying theory of such disclosure is that transparency will weed out
underlying cognitive and social factors that can, consciously or
unconsciously, lead to abusive pay. 199 Executive compensation scholars
have explained how the human dynamics and conditions involved in pay
negotiations can lead to pay abuses, particularly if conducted in secret.
They have shown the ineffectiveness of litigation to fully address the
problem because of court reluctance to interfere with ‚business judgments‛
about pay. And they have urged the crucial role of transparency—that is,
exposing pay arrangements to the disinfecting power of ‚sunshine‛—to
force companies to ensure that their pay arrangements can be reasonably
justified based on the requirements of the job and the performance of the
executive.200
The regulatory approach to pay discrimination should be more similar,
at least on a conceptual level, to that of executive compensation. 201 Rather
than portraying pay discrimination as the result of employers’ intentional
victimization of women, it should be conceptualized as a market failure. 202
This market failure is caused by asymmetric information when wages are
established through secret, unchecked discretionary pay regimes or
negotiation processes. Adequate, accurate information is a crucial
component of any effectively functioning market. Yet, most people know
more about the consumer products they buy than they do about their own
market value. Transparent pay systems would encourage employers to
develop and explain to employees the criteria on which compensation is
based, and to ensure that they can justify pay disparities. Transparency
would help employees, and women in particular, have a better sense of
their value and help them to negotiate for fair wages. Pay transparency
would serve as an ‚outrage constraint‛ on unjustified pay. Employers
would be more careful to ensure that the wage offered was consistent with
the ‚skill, effort, and responsibility‛ of the job and that any pay disparities
between employees performing substantially similar jobs can be explained
by job-related or business-related reasons203—like the EPA requires.
198

See id. at 1003.
See id. at 983-84.
200 See id. at 1001.
201 See id. at 1003-04.
202 Indeed, the purpose clause of the EPA conceptualizes the Act’s purpose in marketrelated terms. See id. 957-58; see also Pub. L. No. 88-38, § 2, 77 Stat. 56, 56 (1963). But that
market purpose has been overshadowed by the civil rights framework of Title VII, which was
passed one year after the EPA.
203 The EPA recognizes that individual characteristics of employees may justify disparate
pay for similar jobs but puts the burden on the employer to explain those reasons as part of its
199
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Of course, transparency alone will not work without providing
employers with an incentive to control for and correct unjustified pay
disparities between employees performing similar work. One approach
would be to require employers of a certain size to conduct periodic
compensation audits to detect pay disparities between men and women
performing similar jobs. These audits would help to identify and correct
any disparities between employees performing the same work that arose
from inadvertence, unconscious biases, or a host of other social or cognitive
factors that may not rise to the level of intentional discrimination. For any
pay disparity between employees performing similar work that exceeded a
certain threshold, the employer would have to either make adjustments for
the lower-paid employee or document the reasons for the disparities.
Some employers, such as IBM, already follow this annual auditing
practice.204 Although employers should not be required to submit the
reports to the government, they should be required to keep them for the
same period of time that they are required to maintain payroll records
under federal law. The records should be available for random audits by
the Department of Labor, which already conducts periodic audits for
overtime and minimum wage violations. If the employer fails to conduct or
maintain adequate records of its pay audits, the investigating agency
should be able to impose fines for non-compliance. In addition, in the
absence of adequate recordkeeping, the employer should forfeit certain
affirmative defenses, such as the ‚factor-other-than-sex‛ affirmative
defense under the EPA.205
Requiring pay transparency or periodic compensation audits would
provide powerful incentives for employers to be more thoughtful and
defined about their compensation plans. Rather than investing individual
managers with unchecked, excessive discretion that can cause unjustified
pay disparities against women, employers would be forced to articulate
reasonable, job-related criteria for pay awards and pay attention to internal
pay equity concerns. Employers would maintain flexibility to vary wages
for reasons such as experience, qualifications, performance, greater
responsibility, and other factors that are related to the job in question. But
employers would be unable to sustain wholly discretionary, ill-defined pay
schemes that systematically and consistently disadvantage women
affirmative defense. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2006).
204 LISA A. MAINIERO & SHERRY E. SULLIVAN, THE OPT-OUT REVOLT: WHY PEOPLE ARE
LEAVING COMPANIES TO CREATE KALEIDOSCOPE CAREERS 286 (2006).
205 Professor Gowri Ramachandran likewise proposes that pay transparency be an
affirmative defense to pay discrimination claims. Gowri Ramachandran, Pay Transparency, 116
PENN ST. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 4) (‚I propose a new kind of intervention
into discrimination through pay transparency—one that leverages the financial interest of
employers and employees.‛).
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workers.
The Paycheck Fairness Act (‚PFA‛)206 pending in Congress takes baby
steps in the direction of pay transparency. The Act prohibits an employer
from retaliating against any employee who ‚has inquired about, discussed,
or disclosed the wages of the employee or another employee.‛207 The Act
instructs the Department of Labor to ‚conduct studies and provide
information to employers, labor organizations, and the general public
concerning the means available to eliminate pay disparities between men
and women . . . .‛208 The Act also authorizes the Equal Employment
Opportunity Council (‚EEOC‛) to complete a survey of pay data that is
currently available under federal law and then ‚issue regulations to
provide for the collection of pay information data from employers as
described by the sex, race, and national origin of employees.‛209
These anti-retaliation and data collection provisions may not be a
panacea, but they would force employers to address pay disparities among
employees who perform similar jobs before a lawsuit is filed. As scholars
have recognized in explaining the benefit of pay disclosure in the executive
compensation context, ‚[t]his is an area in which the very recognition of
problems may help to alleviate them. Managers’ ability to influence pay
structures depends on the extent to which the resulting distortions are not
too apparent to market participants . . . .‛210
2.

A More Workable Litigation Remedy

Although voluntary efforts by employers to correct unjustified pay
disparities are preferable to litigation for both employers and employees, a
statutory remedy for pay discrimination remains crucial as an incentive for
employer compliance and a means of employee redress. As Professor
Melissa Hart has written: ‚Without the possibility of redressing harm, . . .
the likelihood of avoiding harm is substantially diminished.‛211 A more
effective legal remedy for pay discrimination would build on the existing
conceptual framework of the EPA, but modify the statute to make it
compatible with the dynamics that can cause gender pay disparities. The
PFA, if modified, would be a step in the right direction.212

206

H.R. 1519, 112th Cong. (2011).
Id. § 3(b)(1)(B).
208 Id. § 6.
209 Id. § 8.
210 LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE PAY 12 (2004).
211 Hart Testimony, supra note 9, at 6.
212 Other scholars have explained how passage of the Paycheck Fairness Act (‚PFA‛)
would help to eliminate market defenses in equal-pay litigation. See Martha Chamallas,
207
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The “Bona-Fide-Factor-Other-Than-Sex”
Affirmative Defense

The most important provision in the PFA would tighten the ‚factorother-than-sex‛ affirmative defense. As explained in prior scholarship, this
defense has become a broad market excuse that has immunized employers
from EPA liability in some circuits.213 If interpreted consistently with the
original purpose of the EPA, the ‚factor-other-than-sex‛ defense should be
limited to those defenses that are job-related and consistent with business
necessity, as a majority of circuits and the EEOC have held.
The PFA codifies the majority approach by replacing the vague phrase
‚any other factor other than sex‛ with the more specific terms ‚a bona fide
factor other than sex, such as education, training, or experience.‛214 The Act
also clarifies that the ‚bona fide factor defense‛ applies ‚only if the
employer demonstrates that such factor (i) is not based upon or derived
from a sex-based differential in compensation; (ii) is job-related with
respect to the position in question; and (iii) is consistent with business
necessity.‛215 If the employer satisfies this standard of proof, the employee
then has the opportunity to demonstrate ‚that an alternative employment
practice exists that would serve the same business purpose without
producing such differential and that the employer has refused to adopt

Ledbetter, Gender Equity and Institutional Context, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1037, 1051 (2009) (‚*T+he
PFA is not the broad stroke that anyone seriously contends will be sufficient to close the
gender pay gap. If passed on the heels of Ledbetter, however, it would constitute a significant
ripple effect that goes well beyond the highly technical point of law in Lilly Ledbetter’s
case.‛); Porter & Vartanian, supra note 20, at 197-98, 203 (explaining that the Paycheck Fairness
Act may help to end the pay gap by minimizing the use of market excuses in equal-pay cases,
but suggesting that the compensatory and punitive damages provision in the Act be
eliminated to ensure passage); Sharon Rabin-Margalioth, The Market Defense, 12 U. PA. J. BUS.
L. 807, 810 (2010) (‚If this important legislation becomes law, the market defense will be
eliminated altogether from the EPA framework of discrimination.‛). But see June E. O’Neill,
Op-Ed., Washington’s Equal Pay Obsession, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 2010, at A19 (‚*T+he PFA is not
fair, sensible or warranted, and it will impose great costs on employers. Some firms
undoubtedly discriminate against women, but their number is small and the federal
government’s existing antidiscrimination apparatus is more than adequate. This new
legislation would simply provide a feast for lawyers—and, by increasing the cost of
employing women, would likely harm its intended beneficiaries.‛); Christina Hoff Sommers,
Op-Ed., Fair Pay Isn’t Always Equal Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2010, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/22/opinion/22Sommers.html
(‚*The
bill+
overlooks
mountains of research showing that discrimination plays little role in pay disparities between
men and women, and it threatens to impose onerous requirements on employers to correct
gaps over which they have little control.‛).
213
214
215

See Eisenberg, supra note 29, at 59-61.
Paycheck Fairness Act, H.R. 1519, 112th Cong. § 3(a)(2) (2011).
Id. § 3(a)(3)(B).
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such alternative practice.‛216 Passage of the ‚bona fide factor‛ provision
would ensure that pay disparities are justified by skill, responsibility, and
effort required for the position, and the unique qualifications and merit of
the employee filling that position.217
b.

A Pragmatic Prima Facie Standard for Similar
Work

One problem left unaddressed by the PFA, as currently drafted, is the
prima facie standard of ‚equal work.‛ Some courts interpret this standard
so strictly that it imposes a glass ceiling on the EPA by excluding women in
non-standardized jobs from its coverage. 218 Consequently, changing the
affirmative defenses in the EPA will not help plaintiffs who cannot
overcome the preliminary prima facie hurdle. It is comparable to the
‚qualified individual with a disability‛ threshold under the Americans
with Disabilities Act (‚ADA‛), which federal courts once interpreted so
restrictively that many ADA cases were dismissed at the prima facie stage
without any consideration of the merits of the claim. 219 Congress ultimately
clarified the broad scope of the ADA’s protections.220
Congress should likewise clarify that the EPA demands a more
pragmatic interpretation that does not mandate strict identity among
compared jobs. Alternatively, the prima facie standard could be changed to
either a ‚similarly situated‛ standard—like that under Title VII—or a
‚comparable work‛ standard, as proposed in the original EPA221 and used
in many state equal-pay laws.222 This should not be confused with
‚comparable worth,‛ which focuses on the intrinsic value or worth of the
job.223 In contrast, a ‚comparable work‛ or ‚similarly situated‛ prima facie
standard would require the plaintiff to show that the predominant nature
and duties of the work are substantially the same in terms of skill,
responsibility, and effort, even if not identical in all respects. This would
allow, for example, a female executive paid less than men on the executive
team or employees performing similar work in different departments to
satisfy the prima facie showing under the EPA.

216

Id.
See Porter & Vartanian, supra note 20, at 197-202 (offering other explanations of the
impact the ‚bona fide factor defense‛ would have on equal pay cases).
218 Eisenberg, supra note 29, at 39-41.
219 See generally Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 191-202 (2002).
220 ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553.
221 See Eisenberg, supra note 29, at 29 (citing CARL E. VAN HORN & HERBERT A. SCHAFFNER,
WORK IN AMERICA: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HISTORY, POLICY, AND SOCIETY 187-88 (2003)).
217

222
223

Id. at 46-47.
Id. at 22 (quoting Cnty. of Wash. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 166 (1981)).
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At the same time, if flexibility is added to the prima facie standard, the
EPA should be amended to allow for de minimis variations in pay. As
currently written, the EPA requires precisely ‚equal pay‛—down to the
last penny.224 Allowing for de minimis differences would recognize the need
for some employer flexibility and avoid quibbling over small amounts.
The definition of de minimis could vary depending on the nature of the
position but should be narrowly construed to avoid abuses. For hourly jobs
in which the tasks are routinized and identical, variations should be
minimal or nonexistent. For higher wage jobs, a higher de minimis
variation—for example, $1000 or less or some other threshold amount per
year—should be allowed.
c.

Group Actions for Systemic Pay Discrimination

The Wal-Mart case highlights one of the biggest problems for women
who experience systemic pay discrimination resulting from discretionary
pay systems: Women cannot challenge discretionary pay systems under
Title VII in a large class action. The PFA would permit Rule 23 class actions
under the EPA.225 After Wal-Mart, however, seeking Rule 23 class
certification may not be successful, especially if the pay discrimination
results—as it frequently does—from a discretionary or ambiguous pay
scheme. One option would be to overturn Wal-Mart with a provision that
clarifies that excessively discretionary, unchecked compensation schemes
that result in disparate pay between men and women performing similar
work constitute a general policy of discrimination sufficient to establish
commonality under Rule 23 for Title VII and EPA claims.
Another option would be to modify the collective action procedure for
the EPA. Because the EPA is part of the Fair Labor Standards Act (‚FSLA‛),
class actions are not permitted.226 Under FLSA’s collective action structure,
every plaintiff must affirmatively ‚opt in‛ to the litigation by filing a
signed consent form with the court.227 The benefit of this approach is that
the preliminary certification standard for a collective action is significantly
more lenient than the standards for class certification. 228 Plaintiffs only

224 Hodgson v. Am. Bank of Commerce, 447 F.2d 416, 420 (5th Cir. 1971) (‚Any wage
differential between the sexes, no matter how small and insignificant, is sufficient under the
statutory prohibition.‛).
225

H.R. 1519, 112th Cong. § 3(c)(3)-(4) (2011).
Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006).
227 Id. (‚No employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action unless he gives his
consent in writing to become such a party and such consent is filed in the court in which such
action is brought.‛).
228 See Cunningham v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 754 F. Supp. 2d 638, 643 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(citations omitted) (internal quotations marks omitted) (‚The similarly situated standard is far
226
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need to show that they are ‚similarly situated‛ and do not have to satisfy
the more demanding prerequisites of Rule 23.
The downside is that a collective action can be considerably more
expensive to manage and litigate, particularly for a class of 1.5 million
members. For example, rather than having a representative group of
plaintiffs answer discovery requests and appear for depositions, defense
attorneys often demand answers to interrogatories for and depositions of
every member of the collective action. This can raise the fees and costs for
all counsel involved.
In addition, the opt-in collective-action procedure is intimidating for
many employees at the initiation of litigation. Although the named
plaintiffs mustered up the courage to take a stand on behalf of the
collective group, other employees may fear retaliation or be less likely to
want to go on public record to challenge the employer in court. In this
respect, employment class actions are very different from other types of
class actions, such as those involving consumer or securities law. Whereas
consumers or investors can simply purchase from another company or go
without the product in question, many employees do not want to risk
unemployment and may not be able to move to another employer if they
lose their jobs. For many women, in particular, claiming pay discrimination
or suing their employer can be career suicide.
Rather than requiring plaintiffs to opt in with signed consent forms,
the statute could be changed to an ‚opt-out‛ procedure. After finding that
the plaintiffs are similarly situated, the court could authorize notice about
the case to members of the collective action and advise them that they must
opt out of the action. This type of modified collective action would provide
greater efficiency and lower cost while accommodating fears that many
employees may have about joining the lawsuit.
d. Damages
Under the EPA, prevailing plaintiffs may recover double damages: the
amount of the pay disparity, plus liquidated damages in an equal
amount.229 If the plaintiff proves a willful violation of the EPA, the statute
of limitations may be extended an additional year to allow for three years
of damages rather than two.230 Under Title VII, prevailing plaintiffs may
recover the amount of the pay disparity plus compensatory and punitive
damages, which are capped depending on the size of the employer. 231
more lenient, and indeed, materially different, than the standard for granting class
certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.‛).
229
230
231

29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006).
29 U.S.C. § 255(a) (2006).
42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1), (3)(A)-(D) (2006).
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The PFA would permit unlimited compensatory and punitive damages
under the EPA.232 This provision is perhaps the least important and most
controversial provision in the proposed PFA. As other scholars have noted,
the Act likely failed to pass because of the enhanced damages provision. 233
But the availability of enhanced damages is meaningless when most
women are recovering nothing at all because they typically lose their cases
for procedural reasons on summary judgment because of the prima facie
standard or the factor-other-than-sex affirmative defense.
The enhanced damages provision was added to the PFA for several
reasons. First, women who discover that they have received less pay than
their male coworkers for performing the same job undoubtedly suffer from
emotional distress. They feel betrayed and humiliated and may experience
a range of serious psychological symptoms. Second, plaintiffs who allege
pay discrimination based on race or national origin are entitled to receive
unlimited compensatory and punitive damages under other federal
statutes, but women who allege pay discrimination based on sex are not.234
Third, the possibility of tougher penalties would perhaps be a stronger
incentive for employers to engage in voluntary compliance to avoid
litigation.
Although enhanced damages would provide more complete relief to
women who experience unjustified pay disparities, the addition of
compensatory and punitive damages would complicate the streamlined
nature of an EPA case. Although the amount of the backpay can be easily
determined through payroll records, compensatory damages require
individualized testimony to prove emotional harm. As Wal-Mart
demonstrates, the addition of individualized proof to a group action may
hamper the case. Indeed, Plaintiffs in Wal-Mart waived their right to
compensatory damages under Title VII and sought only backpay because
of the individualized proof issues that would be required.
There are other ways to accomplish enhanced damages in equal pay
cases without adding the complexity involved in proving compensatory
and punitive damages. First, in the age of computerized personnel records,
the two-year (or three for willful violations) statute of limitations on equal
pay claims could be extended. Many women who file equal-pay claims
have worked for their employers for many years or even decades. Consider

232

Porter & Vartanian, supra note 20, at 202.
Id.
234 See A Fair Share for All: Pay Equity in the New Am. Workplace: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on Health, Educ., Labor and Pensions, 110th Cong. 6 (2010) (statement of Stuart J. Ishimaru,
Acting Chairman, U.S. EEOC), available at http://help.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Ishimaru.pdf
(testifying that enhanced damages provisions would put ‚gender based pay discrimination on
a more equal footing with pay discrimination on other bases such as race‛).
233
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the experience of women like Lilly Ledbetter, who worked for nineteen
years at lower pay than her male co-workers. The statutes of limitations for
pay-discrimination claims under both Title VII235 and the EPA236 remain
very short given the long spans of time that many women receive unequal
pay for equal work.
Another way to provide enhanced damages for willful equal-pay
violations would be to add a higher multiplier to the backpay award.
Under the liquidated damages provision in the EPA, a prevailing plaintiff
receives two times the amount of backpay owed.237 The statute could
include a higher liquidated damages multiplier. Some state wage-payment
statutes, for example, provide for treble rather than double damages. 238
Ultimately, however, the primary goal should be a workable paydiscrimination remedy under which women with meritorious claims can
survive procedural hurdles and summary judgment and recover at least
the amount of the pay disparity, plus liquidated damages and the costs
involved in bringing a successful suit.

CONCLUSION
The decision in Wal-Mart offers valuable lessons to policymakers about
the legal quest for equal pay. First, the law needs to catch up with the
realities of how most pay discrimination occurs in the modern workplace.
As experienced by the women at Wal-Mart, and as supported by volumes
of research, pay discrimination frequently results from pay systems that—
like the compensation scheme in Wal-Mart—invest excessive, unchecked
discretion in the hands of individual supervisors. Such systems allow a
host of cognitive, social, and situational dynamics to skew wage decisions
against women. To address this pervasive problem, Congress should adopt

235 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2006). Under the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, a person may
file a charge of pay discrimination within 180 days—or, in some states that have work-sharing
agreements with the EEOC, 300 days—of any of the following: ‚*(1)+ when a discriminatory
compensation decision or other practice is adopted‛; ‚*(2)+ when an individual becomes
subject to a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice‛; or ‚*(3)+ when an
individual is affected by application of a discriminatory compensation decision or other
practice, including each time wages, benefits, or other compensation is paid, resulting in
whole or in part from such a decision or other practice.‛ 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3)(A) (Supp. III
2010).
236 The statute of limitations for EPA claims is two years, or three years for willful
violations. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a) (2006). Unlike Title VII, plaintiffs may file EPA claims directly in
court and need not file a charge with the EEOC.
237 Id. § 216(b).
238 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 150 (2010) (mandating treble damages for
prevailing plaintiffs in wage cases).
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incentives for self-regulation by employers, such as pay transparency and
periodic pay audits, in exchange for certain affirmative defenses in paydiscrimination litigation.
Second, women need a more workable litigation remedy for pay
discrimination. The PFA is a step in that direction because it clarifies that
the ‚factor-other-than-sex‛ must be a ‚bona fide factor-other-than-sex‛ that
is job-related and consistent with business necessity. Even with this
important change, however, a problem left unaddressed is the prima facie
standard of ‚equal work‛ under the EPA, which often causes women to
lose EPA claims. In addition, Wal-Mart highlights the steep procedural
hurdles that women face in joining together to challenge widespread pay
disparities. Wal-Mart should be overturned with a provision that clarifies
that a compensation scheme that results in substantial gender pay
disparities because of excessive, unchecked discretion in the hands of
supervisors constitutes a general policy of discrimination sufficient to
establish commonality under Rule 23. Alternatively, the collective action
procedure under the EPA could be modified to a presumptive opt-out
procedure.
Unless and until equal-pay laws are modernized, women who
experience unjustified pay disparities will continue to be harmed twice:
once by their employers, and again by federal laws that promise equal pay
for equal work and court protection, but deliver only defeat and
disappointment.

